The Autocatalysis of Communication and Power: Hamid Karzai's Rise as President of Afghanistan

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In this paper I will discuss a social psychological model of communication and leadership with reference to the Hamid Karzai’s rise to the Presidency of Afghanistan (see Appendix for a list of major events reported by the BBC). This ‘power-communication’ model (Hogg & Reid, 2001; Reid & Ng, in press) was originally conceived as an attempt to predict the conditions under which leaders abuse power. It does this by considering the relationship between leaders and followers, the way in which leaders communicatively position themselves in relation to both followers and outgroups, and the concomitant effects of such positioning on a leaders ability to maintain and enhance power within the group. The model is diachronic—it describes three stages of leadership that precede the abuse of power: (1) leader emergence, (2) consolidation of the leadership position, and (3) power differentiation between leader(s) and followers.

At the core of the model is the idea that communication and resources for power mutually feed one another (they are ‘autocatalytically related’). This process is the mechanism that leads to transitions between the leadership stages. The assumptions are as follows: To gain legitimacy, resources, control, and ultimately, to exercise power (benevolently or otherwise) leaders must gain support—without support, such resources cannot be obtained in the first instance, nor can they be maintained. The crucial question, then, is how is it that leaders obtain and maintain support? The argument is that leaders must first strategically communicate views that resonate with the beliefs of followers; they must position themselves so as to appear to be highly representative of their group—they must be perceived to share in the group’s aspirations and embody the ethos of the group. Once such an image has been successfully diffused, support will follow, as will access to resources of power. But access to power (e.g., legitimate authority,
media attention or control, military command) further enables a leader to represent—and in fact shape—the image of the group, and this will confer further resources of power. Thus, occupying the representative position of the group feeds power, and power feeds the leader’s ability to control the representative group position. This process continues until resources for power are exhausted, or larger counter powers are mounted to depose the leadership.

In this paper I will outline the theoretical background for the model, discuss the model with reference to the case of Hamid Karzai, and then I will close with a discussion of the model in terms of state failure.

**The Social Identity Perspective and the Communication-Power Model of Leadership**

The communication-power model of leadership is composed of ideas drawn from the social identity perspective (a social psychological approach to understanding intra- and inter-group dynamics), and work on the relations between language and power.

First, it is necessary to describe the relationships between language and power. The relationship between language and power can be conceived in one of two general ways. The power *behind* language describes the subordinate relation of language to power. This idea is captured in Mao’s famous adage: ‘power comes from the barrel of a gun’. From this perspective, language merely reflects or reveals an actor’s power base. Importantly, language does not simply serve as a passive channel for the exercise of power and influence. Language is an active co-player in social action. The power *of* language describes this active contribution of language to power. Language can be used to *create* material power, to *conceal* or mask the exercise of power, and it can contribute to the *normalization* of dominance relationships.
The communication-power model also draws heavily on self-categorization theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). This theory is relatively complex, and so I will describe it in some detail. Self-categorization theory makes some simple assumptions about the nature of self and social relations. On the one hand, we can define ourselves as unique individuals with idiosyncratic attributes that distinguish us from people within our groups (e.g., the ‘smart’ one in the family, the ‘joker’ at work). This individual level of self-definition is found in social contexts where comparisons among group members is relevant and/or important. On the other hand, we can also define ourselves as members of a collectivity, and in so doing perceive ourselves as more or less representative instances of a group as a whole (e.g., I am an ‘American’, a ‘feminist’). Collective self-definitions are found in intergroup social contexts where comparisons between groups are relevant and/or important. Given these assumptions, the theory makes predictions about the social contextual circumstances that promote shifts between individual and collective self-definition. The core process is labeled ‘depersonalization’—this is the social cognitive mechanism that leads people to internalize collective identities, to think and behave in terms of those identities.

The question, then, is what social contextual conditions make collective self-definition relevant and/or important, and why do people to internalize some social identities and not others? The answer is that people internalize ‘fitting’ categories. Fitting categories are ones that cohere with (1) individual differences (e.g., motivations, values, needs, task demands, and so on), (2) the distribution of groups in the social environment (‘comparative fit’), and (3) the normative content of those groups (‘normative fit’). In simple terms, people internalize categories that are accessible to them personally, especially when that category is cognitively present in the social world, and behavior of group members is normatively consistent with those categories. For
example, a female psychologist at a conference attended by psychologists, sociologists, and political scientists will most likely categorize the groups as separate entities (as opposed to undifferentiated ‘social scientists’) to the extent that: (1) she identifies strongly with being a psychologist (being a psychologist is accessible), (2) she observes the different camps congregating separately (there is comparative fit), and (3) she notices the respective members of different camps speaking with distinctive and mutually unintelligible nomenclature (normative fit). However, this process is context dependent and fluid. We can imagine this same female psychologist at the same conference, but where she observes separation between male and female attendees, and notices the men discussing masculine topics. This same individual might then be more inclined to identify herself as a woman than as a psychologist.

There are a great number of social conditions that promote the fit of some social identities above others. A brief list includes rapidly changing status structures, intergroup conflict, political uncertainty, simple propinquity, or even (relevant to current purposes) the communication of leaders. Importantly, these social contextual variables also provide the basis for normative action. This is because we internalize social categories that make the most sense of our social world—categories that describe and prescribe social action. Such social categories are cognitively represented as prototypes. Prototypes are context sensitive ‘fuzzy sets’ of attributes or traits that (more or less) consensually define a group within a given social context. In our previous example, we might describe the prototypical image of psychologists (in relation to other social scientists) as “overly concerned with inconsequential social processes”, “finicky about small psychological details”, and so on. Similarly, we can easily imagine a list of relevant features for our psychologist as a woman (and again we would tend to agree on those traits that are most representative). For the individual, social identification with the prototype (i.e.,
internalization of those traits and attributes) provide a reference point for beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors. ‘Being’ a woman is to internalize and perceive the world in terms of attitudes and beliefs of women. The same goes for all other social categories, what differs is the normative content of the category, and social contextual conditions that affect the relevance and importance of that category to self-definition.

At the same time, we don’t simply perceive social groups as undifferentiated lists of prototypical traits. Some people are more prototypical than others. It is this fact that makes it possible to theorize social influence, leadership, social attraction, and so on. People who happen to occupy prototypical positions of groups (by accident or design), are the people we pay attention to. The reason we pay attention to such people is because they occupy the position that clarifies and gives meaning to the social world—they are the people whose position distinguishes what ‘we’ the ingroup believe in contrast to what ‘they’ the outgroup believe (in fact, this can be expressed mathematically as a ‘meta-contrast’ ratio between intragroup similarities and intergroup differences). The prototypical position is the one that simultaneously maximizes within category similarities and inter-category differences. Because prototypical group members make sense of the world, because their views are the one’s we see as most representative of us versus them, we are influenced by them, we like them, and we are most likely to endorse them as leaders. Although we might attribute all kinds of personal characteristics to such people, the reason we do so is due entirely to the social context we find ourselves in.

The power-communication model extends self categorization theory by considering how leaders use language to manage (create, distort, depoliticize) prototypical definitions of groups, and how the autocatalytic relationship between the communicative control of prototypicality contributes to power. A leader can use resources of power to maintain the focus of the group
prototype on self (e.g., media control). A leader who does this successfully will be able to control followers’ perception of social context. There are a number of ways in which leaders can do this. For example, a leader can define the group in the context of conflict with an outgroup, by singling out and ‘othering’ group members who threaten the leadership position, or re-defining former outgroup members as ingroup members, thus extending the power of the group. Over time, the autocatalytic relationship between the communicative control of prototypicality and resources of power promote transitions between different stages of leadership.

However, abuse of power does not follow as a natural consequence in all groups. Leaders can exercise power with benevolence or malevolence. The abuse of power comes about when (1) the leader has come, over time, to command so much power that an intergroup relationship between leader and followers emerges (i.e., the leader no longer represents the group so much as the leadership position, and comes to believe that the group exists for the leadership rather than vice versa), and (2) a serious threat to the leadership position emerges (e.g., foreign conquest, the emergence of a prototypical contender for the leadership role).

The Communication-Power Model of Leadership and Hamid Karzai

Before discussing the theory, it is worth noting that Karzai’s leadership is relatively new. Stages (1) and (2) can easily be discerned, but stage three has probably only just started, and so discussion of that phase will be necessarily speculative. It can be argued that stage four preceded Karzai’s emergence—the Taleban gained power over Afghanistan, abused their power, and represented their own interests above their supporters. Karzai is the prototypical contender who came to represent the ‘new’ Afghanistan that shifted as conflict between the United States and allies changed the social context.
It is also important to first consider the historical situation in Afghanistan preceding Karzai’s emergence (see Britannica, 2001). In the most general terms, the more recent events unfolded as follows: In 1978 a centrist government was overthrown by military commanders who installed two parties that were united as a communist government. This government lacked popular support, and so the regime allied itself with the Soviet Union, actively suppressed opposition, and brought in a series of social and political changes. This led to insurrection from anti-communist Muslim guerrillas (later to become known as the mujahideen). In 1979, under the pressure of factional splits and guerrilla activity, the Soviets sent in troops to maintain their client state. This led to wide popular support for the mujahideen, who were supplied arms by the United States, United Kingdom, and China. After protracted war and stalemate, the Soviets withdrew in 1989 leaving a decimated country, and a fragmented and depleted mujahideen. Because the mujahideen were so demoralized, the communist leadership was able to maintain power until 1992. When they were overthrown, and an Islamic government was declared under the leadership of President Burhanuddin Rabbani. However, continuing instability led to fighting between the government forces of Rabbani and the prime minister Gulbuiddin Hekmatyar. Because of the instability, and because of large numbers of refugees, the international interests of Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Pakistan competed for control in Afghanistan.

The (mainly Pashtun) Taleban then formed in late 1994 (it was believed to be funded by the Pakistani secret service), and made headway in ‘neutralizing’ opposition, and instituting social stability by enforcing a extremist Islamic state. By the end of 1996, the Taleban had de facto control of most of the country, except for a northern region controlled by allies General Dostum and commander of Government forces Ahmad Shah Masood (it is believed that the Taleban killed approximately 35,000 civilians in gaining this control). Despite control and
promise of stability, the Taleban continued to kill many civilians, oppressed women and girls, and enforced strict Islamic law through amputations and executions. In 1997, Dostam was overthrown by one of his own military officers, General Pahlawan, and went into exile in Turkey; Pahlawan meanwhile welcomed the Taleban into Mazar-e Sharif, and this seemed to have confirmed national control for the Taleban (this was quickly recognized by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates). However, Pahlawan changed sides once again, and drove the Taleban out of Mazar-e Sharif, and in doing so killed several thousand Taleban prisoners. In August 1998, Mazar-e Sharif finally fell to the Taleban, and largely Tajik government forces allied themselves with Uzbeks and Hazaras to form the Northern Alliance. The Taleban then blamed the Iranian backed Hazaras for the massacre in Mazar-e Sharif, killed a number Iranian officials, and threatened missile attacks on Iranian cities. In response, Iran amassed 200,000 troops on the border.

On August 7, U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania sustained terrorist bomb attacks. The U.S. suspected Osama Bin-Laden, and on August 20 fired missiles into Taleban terrorist training camps in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the Taleban refused to give up Bin-Laden to the U.S., claiming there was no evidence linking him with the attacks. In February and March 1999, the UN sponsored talks between Masood and the Taleban, but the Taleban would not accept coalition rule, only rule by their leader Mullah Omar. In July, President Clinton signed into effect economic sanctions against the Taleban. Fighting between the Taleban and Northern Alliance continued through 2000 and 2001. U.S coalition forces acting on the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the U.S. began their support of the Northern Alliance and bombing on 7, October, 2001.
Stage 1: Leader Emergence (October, 2001 to 27, December, 2001)

The events that preceded Karzai’s emergence as leader was marked by considerable in-fighting between different ethnically aligned warlords. It seems that, in part, foreign interests were able to capitalize on this factionalism and hence infiltrate the Taleban. In addition to this, non-separation of church and state was pivotal in the rise of the Taleban. Since Rabbani, Afghanistan had represented itself as a relatively non-distinct *Islamic* nation. This made it possible for foreign religious leaders to gain influence within government, thus rendering the Taleban particularly vulnerable to foreign control. A further dimension to the control of the Taleban was the active suppression of potential alternative leaders. The Taleban (in some cases possibly factional interests) have been implicated in several assassinations. These include: Karzai’s father, Abdul Ahad Karzai (a royalist associated with the exiled King, Zahir Shah) who was assassinated on July 15, 1999; Ahmad Shah Masood (an ex-government representative of Rabbani) was assassinated on September 9, 2001; and Abdul Haq (a Pashtun warlord) was assassinated on 27, October, 2001 as U.S. special forces attempted a helicopter rescue.

Presumably, each man was targeted because he was seen as a potential national figure. Further to this, it is worth noting that Karzai joined the Taleban in the early 1990s and was asked to become their foreign minister; by 1994 Karzai had become disaffected by foreign influence, and went into exile in Pakistan. Together, these events suggest that wide spread foment had already begun to de-stabilize the Taleban by the late 90s.

Karzai, too, narrowly escaped assassination by the Taleban. However, there are conflicting accounts of this event. Donald Rumsfeld (on 8, November, 2001) claimed that Karzai had been ‘extracted’ to Pakistan by U.S. special forces. This implies that the U.S. government already had the idea of installing Karzai as a puppet leader. However, any perception of this
being the case would be damaging for Karzai; it would make easy ammunition for detractors to question the legitimacy of his rule. It is not surprising, then, that Karzai refuted Rumsfeld’s account. In his alternative account, locals had warned him of an attack by “mostly Arab forces”, he had engaged in 10 hours of fighting, and had lived three days on bread and green tea (BBC news, 8 November, 2001). Further to this, Karzai claimed that he could defeat the Taleban himself, but needed assistance to remove foreign elements (ibid). Thus, Karzai’s first line of rhetoric was framed in such a way as to make himself appear a natural successor to the Taleban, while at the same time drawing a line between himself and the U.S. government.

Second, Karzai was careful to describe exactly who within the Taleban he was in conflict with:

They have killed Afghans. They have trained their guns on Afghan lives. ... . These Arabs are in Afghanistan to learn to shoot. They learn to shoot on live targets and those targets are the Afghan people, our children and women. We want them out (BBC news, 2 November, 2001).

Karzai’s war was with foreign elements within the Taleban—Arabs—not the ‘rank and file’ members. In fact, most of the Taleban were Pashtuns, members of the same tribal group as Karzai. It would be quite impossible for Karzai to maintain leadership while being perceived to have engaged in conflict with members of his own tribe. What is more, as the majority ethnic group (making up approximately 42% of the population), he would need their support to become leader (at least in the longer term). Karzai’s alignment with the Pashtuns is particularly important in light of his association with the Northern Alliance, whose treatment of (Pashtun) Taleban was brutal. For example, a further 600 Taleban prisoners were massacred while under the control of General Dostum (BBC news, 29 November, 2001).
Third, the tone of Karzai’s rhetoric was decidedly religious. Clearly, to gain widespread support, Karzai needed to focus on and represent widely held beliefs and ideologies. This is not to say that Karzai adopted the same religious positioning of his predecessors (Rabbani and the Taleban). Instead, Karzai used religion in his statements, but did so without any clear reference to his position. For example:

*I’m determined to stay on. I trust in God, I’m sure God is going to help the Afghan people regain their country. . . I want these foreign terrorist elements out of my country, I want it to belong to Afghans* (BBC news, 8 November, 2001).

Karzai’s appeals to religion are in an obfuscated style—Karzai could easily be referring to a Christian God in this Rhetoric. By maintaining a such a style, Karzai could, potentially at least, appeal to the spectrum of religious interests while committing to none (Karzai later did exactly that—see stage 2).

The Taleban were quickly routed by the Northern Alliance and allied forces. Only pockets of resistance remained in mountainous areas; the remainder presumably fled for sanctuary in nearby countries, or were re-absorbed into the population. At this point, Karzai’s task changed. The United Nations had plans for a conference between major figures to begin 27, November, 2001, and to gain a leadership role he would have to form a coalition with the Northern Alliance. Importantly, the Northern Alliance, being composed of minority tribes from the north of the country (they are made up predominantly of Tajiks and Hazaras—both minorities) would have been unable to sponsor a truly national figure from among their own ranks. A possible solution, then, was for Karzai to become leader, but for the Northern Alliance figures to become ministers and wield power covertly. Indeed, Northern Alliance statements played down any interest in governance. Yunus Qanooni (a Tajik, ex-deputy of defense minister
in Rabbani’s government) stated:

*There is no glory for us to continue fighting and monopolise power and insist on our past positions. The glory is to do our best and be sincere in pursuing the UN plans for peace and stability in Afghanistan. We want to lead Afghanistan out of the Middle Ages (BBC news, 27 November, 2001).*

As it turned out, these same Northern Alliance Tajiks gained control of the interim government—posts included ministries of defense, interior, and foreign affairs. Karzai was, of course, appointed interim Prime Minister (and this was done *in absentia*—possibly because Karzai wanted to maintain an ‘on the ground’ image to further disassociate himself from the U.S).

To summarize, at the stage of leadership emergence, Karzai’s rhetoric framed him, clearly, as a prototypical Afghan. This rhetoric (1) portrayed him as instrumental in defeating the Taleban, (2) as religious, and (3) as against foreign ‘controllers’ of the Taleban. Together, this rhetoric at once placed Karzai in an influential position, and maximized his potential support base. Of course, it would be naive to suggest that U.S diplomacy was not instrumental in Karzai’s appointment; he almost certainly would not have been appointed without U.S. support. Nevertheless, it probably fair to say that Karzai would not stand much chance of gaining popular support and consolidating the leadership position had he not engaged in such rhetoric.

**Stage 2: Consolidating the Leadership Position (December 28, 2001 to June 24, 2002)**

According to the communication-power model, the second stage of leadership involves the consolidation of power through the strategic use of communication. The process operates as follows: the leader continues to use language to maintain the strategically important prototypical
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ingroup position, this makes it possible to exercise power, and by successfully exercising power the leader can gain further power, and hence, more control over the prototypical position in the group. There is a good deal of evidence for this autocatalytic process in Karzai’s bid to become President.

First, some background information. By December 28, 2001, Karzai had been appointed by representatives at the Bonn conference as interim Prime Minister. This post was to be maintained until mid June, 2002, when a ‘loya jirga’ (national meeting) would elect a President and government ministers. Over the next six months, Karzai would need to form coalitions with various government factions if he was going to be elected President. Having been elected a transitional Prime Minister, Karzai began what must have been a grueling schedule of shuttle diplomacy. He met with and received numerous foreign leaders: British (January, 8) and German (January, 9) leaders visited Afghanistan, Karzai made trips to Iran (January, 14), Saudi Arabia (January, 19), and China (January, 22), Kofi Annan visited Afghanistan (January 25), Karzai then visited the United States (January, 27) and Britain (January, 31), Pakistan (February, 8), Iran again (February, 24), India (February, 26), France (date unknown), Uzbekistan (March, 4), Russia (March, 12), and finally he headed for Italy to meet with exiled King Zahir Shah (April, 16). On top of this, Karzai had to manage a number of major internal crises—among others, assassination of a Government minister, failed assassination attempts on other ministers, a coup attempt, and factional fighting in remote areas, some of which was instigated by officials appointed to his transitional administration.

Having gained office as Prime Minister, Karzai was able to consolidate and extend his power by forming alliances with key neighboring leaders. The ties that Karzai forged with Iran proved to be particularly beneficial. Evidence had began to emerge that ex-President Rabbani
was attempting to mobilize support to install himself as a candidate for the Presidency. A key ally was Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, an Islamic fundamentalist leader during the Soviet occupation. It seems the plan of these two ex-leaders was to attempt to mobilize support from the base of fundamentalist Islam still prevalent in the ex-Taliban Pashtun majority. However, on February 26, two days after having met with Karzai, Iran announced that they had expelled Hekmatyar from their country. At the same time, Abdullah Abdullah (Karzai’s Tajik foreign minister) announced that Hekmatyar would be tried for war crimes if he were to return to Afghanistan. These actions were obviously designed to counter the threat that these leaders posed to the interim administration. Having decreased the power of these contenders, Karzai’s rhetorical strategy began to shift, he demonstrated public support for minority Islamic movements—something that would be considered quite unthinkable for the fundamentalists. For example, he attended (on March 25, 2002) the Shia Muslim Ashura ceremony, a minority event that involves ritualistic self flagellation. Now that Karzai had side lined the imminent threat of fundamentalism, he was able to provide legitimacy for a more moderate and inclusive form of Islam, and thus produce a longer-term basis in power for his own government.

Taken together, this string of events clearly demonstrates the autocatalytic relationship between the prototypical group position and power. Karzai began to gain support through his nationalistic stance, and this eventually led to the office of Prime Minister. Having become Prime Minister he was able to forge international alliances, which he used to gain further power. Having exercised his new powers to side line his opponents, Karzai was then able to re-define the prototypical ingroup position by legitimizing the moderate over fundamentalist form of Islam.

There are a great number of events that might be used to further demonstrate this process.
However, I will just describe two more examples that seem to be crucial to Karzai’s election as President...

First, a major hurdle for Karzai was (and perhaps still is) to gain control over his Northern Alliance Ministers (particularly Ministers of Defense, Intelligence, & Justice). For example, there is evidence that these and other high officials were involved in the assassination of Abdul Rahman (Civil Aviation Minister) on February, 14, 2002. To gain control, Karzai needed to separate these men, and others, from their tribal allegiances. This is not to say that tribalism, per se, is a major hurdle to gaining control in Afghanistan, the major problem is that warlords are able to mobilize support around tribal allegiances. Once the power of the warlords is countered by a national military, ethnic tensions would quickly lessen. Karzai does this by appealing for international support for a multi-ethnic national military. This would require funds to set up infrastructure, and international expertise to perform the training. Karzai sets about doing this with perhaps the only leverage he had available—the threat of terrorism and narcotics.

At the international aid conference in Tokyo, January 21, 2002, Karzai states:

In an environment of inadequate security, fragmented governance, and non-integration of Afghan returnees, Afghanistan could remain a source of instability to the world and the region. . . The challenges of bringing security to all Afghans for the purpose of establishing peace and eradicating the threat of global terrorism and narcotics, is still ahead of us. . .

To begin with, Karzai was successful only in receiving pledges of support. Despite being offered approximately $4.5b, only $40-50m was quickly released. Part of the problem was that international donors preferred to give money to specific projects to avoid having the money stolen by corrupt officials. Karzai maintained this strategy, and in what was described as a
significant policy change (BBC news, 28 January, 2002), he received support from the United States to fund and train a national army. While it is most likely that the commitment made by the United States was a covert ploy for maintaining strategic interest in the region (in fact, General Franks stated August 15, 2002, that he expects a U.S. presence in Afghanistan much like South Korea), it remains that for Karzai this control enabled him to rein in factions outside of Kabul, and there is at least an appearance (if not reality) that Karzai’s appeals were instrumental in this.

At the same time, Karzai also backed the United States on their decision not to confer Prisoner of War status upon the al-Qaeda and Taleban captives held in Cuba. It is possible that Karzai was held to this as part of a quid pro quo agreement, as it is clearly against his interest to be seen to side with the United States (besides internal dissent, both Iran and China voiced concerns over U.S. presence in Afghanistan). Probably to counter for this, on February 6, 2002, Karzai contradicted U.S. accounts of two bombing incidents. Karzai claimed that the U.S. had killed 80 civilians, but that they had immediately explained and apologized.

A second major political effort involved gaining the support of the exiled King, Zahir Shah. Zahir Shah is considered a strong symbol for unification because he has the support of all ethnic factions, and he is a reminder of a more stable past. However, there was a danger that Zahir Shah might attempt to retake his throne; he possessed a great deal of popular support, a contingent of Royalists in Karzai’s ministry, and had stated that he would take whatever role the ‘people decided’. To get around this problem, Karzai was careful to secure Zahir Shah’s support through diplomatic efforts (again, it is likely that U.S. diplomacy was played a role). When Zahir Shah returned on April 17, 2002, it was expected that Kabul television would provide extensive coverage. However, the television station went ‘mysteriously’ off air for two days—reportedly the longest time in living memory (BBC news, 21 April, 2002). Once television re-started, it
aired a statement by Zahir Shah where he claimed no interest in reviving the monarchy, and gave Karzai his full support, describing him as a “patriot, a true Afghan, a son of a martyr” (ibid).

By the time the loya jirga started on 11 June, Karzai had released 260 Taleban prisoners, and announced that he would release all members of the Taleban who did not occupy senior positions in the regime (3 January); stabilized fighting in Gardez and Khost; raised a new national flag (5 February); instituted a free press law (9 February); rounded up the suspected murderers of Abdul Rahman (16 February); re-opened schools that include girls (23 March); saw his security forces make 300 arrests to foil of an assassination attempt (5 April); sees the graduation of the first battalion of national troops (6 April); gains nomination as head of state along with the support of key ministers (1, June); reports of 8 regional delegates killed leading up to loya jirga, and controversy over Ministry appointments, but is still elected President (14 June).

Stage 3: Power Differentiation (June 25, 2002 to 2004?)

At some stage of a leaders tenure it is possible that an equilibrium point of power will be reached and then, eventually, surpassed. This is the point where the leader gains enough power to be able to continue the leadership role without the threat of imminent demotion, deposition, or possibly in Karzai’s case, assassination. As time goes on, assuming the leader continues to pursue a prototypical image, power will likewise continue to accumulate, and this will not stop unless some form of counter power keeps the leader in check. If this does happen, eventually an intergroup relationship between leader and followers will develop; a point where the leader begins to operate on behalf of power, not followers. This condition is necessary for an abuse of power to take place, although it is not sufficient.
In Karzai’s case, it is unlikely that the point of equilibrium has been reached. For example, on July 6, Haji Abdul Qadir (Vice President and Minister of Public Works) was assassinated. It is possible that this was done by ex-mujahideen who were opposed to Qadir’s work to stop the production of opium, and/or a relation of one of the 8 farmers killed in clashes with security officers in April. On the other hand, it remains possible that Qadir was killed because he was seen as representing Pashtun influence in the Government. This possibility is suggested by reports (on July 10), that Karzai was considering an offer of close protection from U.S. special forces.

**Stage 4: Abuse of Power and State Failure**

Abuse of power is most likely to occur when: (1) leaders define themselves as a legitimate interest over and above their followers (i.e., leaders perceive an *inter*-group rather than *intra*-group relationship with followers), (2) leaders have access to a great deal more power than followers (and are *able* to represent their personal interests over the interests of followers), and crucially, (3) a threat to the leadership position arises, and this triggers the abuse of power. There are a great number of forms such a threat might take. External forces might include: natural disasters, inter-national economic collapse, or conquest by a foreign force. Similarly, internal forces could lead to an abuse of power: the rise of a leadership contender from among the ranks, corruption, or intra-national economic collapse. Conditions one and two can be considered the necessary conditions for an abuse of power; condition three—threat to leadership—serves as the trigger, and can be considered the sufficient condition. The more severe the threat to the leadership position is, the more likely power will be abused. Further, there are a number of ways in which power can be abused. These include engaging the group in unnecessary intergroup
conflict, the creation and pillorying of ingroup deviants, or the scapegoating of defenseless minorities. The more severe the threat to the leadership, the more severe the abuse of power is likely to be. A relatively innocuous abuse of power might include benefiting from knowledge of stock markets or voting for a salary rise, while relatively extreme abuses would include unsubstantiated capital punishment, massacre, or genocide.

State failure is strongly related to, but not synonymous with, the conditions that lead to the abuse of power. This is because a number of the external conditions noted above might lead to state failure when the leader does not abuse power. These would be circumstances that are so powerful that they destabilize or destroy the government, independent of any action the government might be able to take. Examples might include natural disasters, inability to subdue an invading army, or international economic collapse. Therefore, a distinction needs to be made between external circumstances that threaten leadership and lead to abuse of power, and external circumstances that destroy a nation’s leadership and government independent of the action of the leader. In other words, the communication-power model only applies to state failures that involve leaders who possess the power to act.

More specifically, abuse of power can be considered a form of state failure if we make the simple assumption that the role of the state is to represent the interests of its population. Because abuse of power is a case of a leader serving personal interests over the interests of the population, it can considered a state failure. This leads to a continuum definition of state failure. A “small” state failure would happen when a leader exercises power to maintain the leadership position, but in doing so a more or less representative government is maintained (e.g., Margaret Thatcher’s 1982 invasion of the Falkland Islands and 1983 landslide re-election victory). A moderate state failure would involve the exercise of power that leads to systemic instabilities that
make establishing a new representative government difficult (an example might be Colombian politics). A large state failure would involve the exercise of power that destroys government and leads to a Hobbsian war of all against all (e.g., the communist leadership of Afghanistan in the late 1970s). Conversely, ‘non’ failed states would be those that possess leadership that continues to represent the interests of their people.
### Appendix: BBC news reports of events in Afghanistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Early 1990s:</td>
<td>Karzai supports Taleban</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mid 1990s:</td>
<td>Karzai splits from Taleban ‘under suspicion of foreign control’</td>
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<tr>
<td>15, July 1999:</td>
<td>Abdul Ahad Karzai (Hamid Karzai’s father) Assassinated (probably by Taleban).</td>
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<tr>
<td>11, September, 2001:</td>
<td>Karzai in exile, Quetta, Pakistan.</td>
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<tr>
<td>27, October, 2001:</td>
<td>Abdul Haq (Pashtun commander returned from exile in Pakistan) assassinated by Taleban in Kabul as U.S. attempt rescue by helicopter. Haq was a potential post-Taleban leader.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2, November, 2001:</td>
<td>Karzai rallying opposition in Uruzgan province—narrowly missed by Taleban</td>
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<tr>
<td>6, November, 2001:</td>
<td>Rumsfeld claims Karzai extracted to Pakistan by U.S. military.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8, November, 2001:</td>
<td>Statements against “foreign terrorist elements” Denies been lifted to Pakistan; claims to have engaged in 10 hours fighting with Arabs (later reports state he is rescued by U.S special forces who arrive by helicopter—June 14, 2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26, November, 2001:</td>
<td>Attempts to persuade Taleban surrender in Spin Boldak &amp; Kandahar.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27, November, 2001:</td>
<td>Bonn talks to create an “interim supreme council”. Attended by representatives of the Northern Alliance, Zahir Shah, the Cyprus Group (former exiles), &amp; Peshawar front (Karzai does not attend)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29, November, 2001:</td>
<td>As many as 600 mainly foreign Taleban prisoners killed in Mazar-e-Sharif by Northern Alliance troops under control of General Dostum.</td>
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<tr>
<td>5, December, 2001:</td>
<td>Karzai installed as interim leader of 30-member cabinet Creation of: commission to organize Loya Jirga (assembly of elders) Central Bank Supreme court</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6, December, 2001:</td>
<td>Rhetoric: Afghani Taleban figures could play role in government, but not “foreign terrorists”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7, December, 2001:</td>
<td>Taleban hand over Kandahar (last city under their control) Pakistan first to congratulate Karzai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11, December, 2001:</td>
<td>“Am I the prime minister?” Karzai informed of Bonn decision by BBC correspondent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12, December, 2001:</td>
<td>Rabbani (former president) claims interim government deal signed under international pressure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17, December, 2001:</td>
<td>Travels to Rome to meet Afghan King in exile, Mohammad Zahir Shah to discuss return as a unifying symbol and head for the loya jirga</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
19, December, 2001: Stresses need for a temporary international security force.
Tom Lauria (ex PR man for US tobacco industry) appointed PR consultant

22, December, 2001: Interim government established, appeal for international aid
U.S. Bomb a convoy allegedly carrying tribal elders to government inauguration from Paktia province.

24, December, 2001: Northern Alliance warlord General Abdul Rasid Dostum appointed defense minister (commander of private army of Uzbek fighters)—considered a step towards a national army.

27, December, 2001: Interim cabinet finalized. Dostum appears as deputy defense minister. Line up dominated by Northern Alliance members.

3, January, 2002: 260 Taleban released from Kabul prison. Karzai intends to release all prisoners that held no senior position in the Taleban.

8, January, 2002: Blair meets with Karzai at Bagram air base north of Kabul.

9, January, 2002: Karzai calls for Afghan army in national address. Armed Afghans banned from public places (not followed). Plus plans to control inflation, boost manufacturing, and allow freedom of the press.

German dignitaries arrive in motorcade and streets blocked off (said to give the appearance that Karzai regime is in control).


18, January, 2002: Visits Saudi Arabia for talks on reconstruction donations.


Fighting in Kunduz by supposed allied commanders (Dostam’s Uzbeks and Rabbani’s Tajiks).

22, January, 2002: Karzai in China, receives further $150m. China asks for return of Muslim-Chinese separatists.


28, January, 2002: U.S. agrees to contribute to the training of a national army and police force.

30, January, 2002: Karzai backs US on not granting POW status to al-Qaeda or Taleban detainees. Karzai asks UN for extension of international security force in Kabul.

Fighting breaks out in Gardez

31, January, 2002: 60 Killed & 200 taken hostage in Gardez in fighting between forces of Saif Ullah (local tribe leader) and Padshah Khan Zadran (a neighboring warlord appointed
Karzai’s rise to President

by the interim govt). Suggested that Northern Alliance majority interim govt. is deliberately trying to de-stabilize Southern areas to gain further power.

Karzai visits London.

1, February, 2002:
Appointed Governor Padsha Khan looses fight for Gardez. Karzai reiterates call for more international troops.

Blair refuses further British troops to avoid the perception of Karzai government as a puppet regime.

Clashes in Mazar-e-Sharif between Uzbek forces of Dostum and Tajik forces of Ustad Atta Mohammad (both are Northern Alliance tribes). A multi-factional force proposed (200 each of Uzbek, Tajik, & local Hazara).

2, February, 2002:
Karzai condemns Padsha Khan’s attempt to take power by force.

3, February, 2002:
Karzai blames Bacha (?) Khan for directing US forces to attack a convoy of tribal members on their way to Loya Jirga (60 killed) on 22 December.

4, February, 2002:
Reports of a dispute over control of Khost b/c of choice of governor.

5, February, 2002:
Karzai raises new national flag.
Replaces lunar calendar with the traditional Afghani solar calendar (year shifts from 1423 to 1381).

6, February, 2002:
Karzai contradicts US accounts of two incidents by stating that the US bombed 80 civilians, and that the US had immediately explained and apologized.

UN envoy Brahimi asks UN security council to urgently consider expanding security forces beyond Kabul.

7, February, 2002:
Governor of Western Afghanistan, Ismail Khan, gives support to Karzai government (but is rumored to be receiving military help from Iran to topple Karzai)

8, February, 2002:
Visits Pakistan and receives backing of Musharraf.

9, February, 2002:
Free press law instituted.
Karzai frees 300 Taleban soldiers. “They were conscripts. . . innocent”

10, February, 2002:
Fahim visits Russia to broker support for formation of Afghan army.

11, February, 2002:
Visit to UAE to re-open Afghan embassy.

14, February, 2002:
Civil aviation minister, Abdul Rahman murdered at Kabul airport (incorrectly rumored to be beaten to death by Muslim pilgrims).

Karzai attends memorial for Abdul Haq (anti-Taleban leader) in Jalalabad.

Taj Mohammad Wardak welcomed as new governor of Paktia province in Gardez (fighting broke out last month between Wardak and local warlord Bacha Khan).

15, February, 2002:
Karzai presses Jack Straw for a larger peacekeeping force.
16, February, 2002: 10 murder suspects rounded up. Includes 3 senior government officials—members of the Northern Alliance led by Ahmed Shah Masood (assassinated last year). Rahman was said to have been allied with them before aligning himself with the former king.

Rahman given state funeral.

17, February, 2002: Ismail Khan awaits formal appointment as Governor of Herat under suspicions of allying himself with Iran.

18, March, 2002: Britain sends force of 1700 to ‘battle remnants of al-Qaeda and the Taleban’ on US request.

20, February, 2002: Probe into Rahman murder begun by senior officials. Suspects are members of Jamiat-e-Islami, which dominates the police force.

Abdullah Abdulah (foreign minister) says murder of Abdul Rahman was the result of a personal feud with intelligence, defense, and justice ministries.

21, February, 2002: British troops fired on in Kabul.

24, February, 2002: Begins three-day Visit to Iran—with 12 ministers—hours after being informed by US special envoy Zalmay Khalilzad that Iran is suspected of sending forces to ‘foment tribal unrest’.

26, February, 2002. Arrives in Delhi with ministers. Iran ‘expels’ Afghan warlord—Gulbuddin Hekmatyar—amid U.S. accusations that Iran had allowed Taleban and al-Qaeda members to escape across their border.

4, March, 2002: Meets Uzbek President after French visit.

6, March, 2002: Influential warlords—including Dostum and Ismail Khan—give support to creating a national army.


8, March, 2002: Regarding Taleban: "We are determined to finish them and send them to hell," said Mr Karzai. "It may take one or two days or more, but they are finished."

10, March, 2002: Calls for a ‘truth commission’ to address human rights atrocities. Problematic in light of probability that some those in power would be accused.

Visits Russia.


12, March, 2002: Visits Russia for talks regarding support for building Afghan army, drug trafficking, and rebuilding of Russian manufacturing facilities.

13, March, 2002: Calls on Afghans in Russia to return home.


23, March, 2002: Schools re-open, girls allowed to return (before Taleban, only 1/10 girls attended)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25, March, 2002</td>
<td>Joins Shia Muslims to mark ceremony of Ashura (ritual mourning by beating oneself)—formerly banned by Taliban.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27, March, 2002</td>
<td>As many as 2000 die in earthquake in Northern Afghanistan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5, April, 2002</td>
<td>300 arrested by government for allegedly organizing a coup. Arrests are made without informing the international security forces. Many arrested affiliates of Hekmatyar Hizb-e-Islami Party—a group that represents Pashtuns (Tajiks dominate interim administration).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Govt. orders destruction of opium fields (est. Afghanistan produces 75% of world's opium, and 80% heroin traded in Europe).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6, April, 2002</td>
<td>First 600 ISAF trained National guard graduate. Coup attempt played down; but clear evidence found that Gulbuddin Hekmatyar was planning to assassinate Karzai and Zahir Shah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8, April, 2002</td>
<td>Defense minister, Mohammad Fahim, survives assassination attempt in Jalalabad (four civilians killed, 50 injured, mostly children) in which mine exploded under central car in convoy. Fahim in the area to discourage the growing of poppies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9, April, 2002</td>
<td>Human rights watch (US org) note that Pashtuns, a minority in Northern Afghanistan, are being killed, beaten, and raped. Pathuns formed majority of the Taliban. Crimes said to be committed by Hazaras, Uzbeks, and Tajiks. Visits Bamiyan. Area where Taliban massacred Hazaras (sections of new administration said to have done the same in the past).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10, April, 2002</td>
<td>Karzai urges foreign governments to pay pledged aid.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11, April, 2002</td>
<td>Farmer's offered $350 per half acre to stop growing poppies. 8 Farmers killed in clashes with security forces when offered $250.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16, April, 2002</td>
<td>Karzai in Rome to accompany Zahir Shah (a Pashtun) back to Afghanistan. A popular figure among all ethnic groups, and a uniting figure for the country. Probable that Northern Alliance factions against Zahir Shah.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18, April, 2002</td>
<td>Bomb blast kills 4 in Khost market. Zahir Shah returns with plans to chair loya jirga (meeting of tribes).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19, April, 2002</td>
<td>Celebrations over return of Zahir Shah begin. Northern Alliance Defense Minister (General Fahim, Jamiat-e-Islami), Rabbani and Abdul Rashoul Saif (mujahideen) notably absent from meetings with Zahir Shah. Zahir Shah visits father's grave with Karzai. Zahir's father assassinated in his presence in 1933.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21, April, 2002</td>
<td>Zahir Shah makes press statement. In support of Karzai, has not returned to re-take the thrown. Televised coverage led news, plus film of lunch with Karzai.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27, April, 2002</td>
<td>Forces of Padshah Khan Zadran and governor Taj Mohammad Wardak clash near Gardez (killing 25, all civilian). Rocket attack on Kabul airport.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Karzai meets Rumsfeld who outlines plans to train and fund a national army but not to further fund an international security force.

28, April, 2002: Karzai calls for exiles to return home in international media. Northern Alliance Military parade though Kabul celebrates mujahideen victory over Soviets. Giant picture of assassinated commander Ahmad Shah Massoud dominated parade (despite the killing of 50,000 Kabul civilians from that era).

Karzai criticized over his karakul hat. Karzai’s garb includes long shirt/loose trousers worn by Pashtuns, the outer robe of Tajiks and Uzbeks, and hat worn by Panjshers. Karzai switches to a synthetic hat when he hears how it was made.


30 May, 2002: Oil pipeline from Turkmenistan to Pakistan via Afghanistan given go ahead (plans already in development during rein of Taleban).

1, June, 2002: Karzai nominated for head of state by: Ismael Khan, Allies of General Dostum, current defense and interior ministers Mohammad Fahim and Younis Qanooni, and various other factional leaders across the country. Complaints of intimidation and bribery in areas where armed factions are dominant.

6, June, 2002: Karzai signs a human rights commission and a judicial commission in the midst of allegations of human rights violations in the election of delegates for the Loya Jirga. Allegations of intimidation, kidnap, and murder surround elections. Karzai reported to have said that about 50% of delegates would be genuine. 50 new seats added for provincial governors, key commanders, and ‘leading personalities’.

7, June, 2002: Donors told to pay. Tokyo pledges were for $4.5b, but only $40-50m has been received. Money tends to be spent on aid projects (e.g., schools) rather than the administration.

Reports that 8 regional candidates killed, and others missing.

8, June, 2002: Fahim (defense minister) says he will support re-election of Karzai.

9, June, 2002: 1 Day prior to Loya Jirga, Padsha Khan Zadran warns of unrest if Zahir Shah (former king) is not restored as head of state. Zadran upset due to appointment then dismissal as governor of Paktia province.

Iran uneasy over perceived American influence over government in Afghanistan. View the installation of a western controlled government as strategic encirclement of Islamic countries under guise of campaign to uproot terrorism. Iranian press portrays Karzai as an American stooge. Reports that Iranian factions have been engaged in action to destabilize the Karzai interim government.

Zahir Shah re-emphasizes his lack of desire for restoring monarchy.

10, June, 2002: Loya Jirga postponed a day ‘due to logistical and preparations not completed on time’. Disagreement over role of Zahir Shah and key ministries said to have sharpened. Later reported that delay due to U.S diplomatic influence.

Zahir Shah voices support for Islamist democracy, and Karzai. Karzai proposes title ‘Father of the Nation’ for Shah. Many Pastuns reported to prefer Zahir Shah to rule in light of Karzai’s government dominated by Tajiks and Uzbeks from the Northern Alliance. Interior minister Younis Qanooni (a Tajik) fakes resignation ‘for the sake of national unity’.

Transitional regime chosen in the Loya Jirga to rule until democratic elections in 2004.

Karzai, code-switching between Pashto and Persia urges end to factional fighting, but received a mixed reaction when Karzai praised participants in the civil war.

12, June, 2002: Unrest at Loya Jirga. Delegates complain that process is not democratic.

Still await vote to elect a chair for the meeting.

Up to 70 delegates walk out of the talks.

13, June, 2002: Many national newspapers in the region consider the talks controlled by U.S interests.

U.S. intervenes to ‘clarify the role of Zahir Shah’

14, June, 2002: Karzai elected President. Heated debate over the role of religion. Some delegates call for Sharia law and the government to be named the ‘transitional Islamic administration’. Interior minister Qanooni expected not to resign after all.

Brahimi (UN rep) asks Generals Dostam and Atta Mohammed to take action to stop clashes in Northern Afghanistan.

Foreign aid agencies threaten to pull out of the north after being attacked by armed factions.

15, June, 2002: Further heated debate over key cabinet posts. Some delegates complain of intimidation by mujahideen factions.

16, June, 2002: Loya Jirga over schedule. Karzai equivocates over selection of ministers—whether they will be appointed by the Loya Jirga or himself. Reports that Pashtun leaders are pushing for more representation.

17, June, 2002: Karzai announces that he wants to elect a new cabinet—in spite of Bonn conference decision to have the Loya Jirga approve appointments.

18, June, 2002: Rabbani states that Loya Jirga should appoint the cabinet. Karzai is under pressure from Pashtuns to drop Tajik ministerial candidates in favor of Pashtuns.
Karzai defers announcement of key ministerial positions.

US intervenes on the right of the loya jirga to appoint key cabinet posts. Karzai asks for one more day to put forward nominees.

(Wording of the Bonn declaration was left intentionally vague—it refers to the loya Jirga appointing key “personnel” but does not specify who they are).

19, June, 2002: Karzai announces nominations for cabinet posts, then approved by the loya jirga with show of hands. Defense and foreign affairs retained by Tajiks, with Fahim promoted to one of the three vice presidencies, but the Interior ministry went to a Pastun governor (Taj Mohammed Wardak). The previously resigned Qanooni appointed to education. Cabinet made up predominantly of Tajiks, Pashtuns, and Hazaras, but no Uzbeks.

Karzai then sworn in as president.

20, June, 2002: Turkey takes over international security forces. Police in Kabul block a road near the Interior Ministry in protest at the appointment of Wardak over Qanuni.

23, June, 2002: Qanuni undecided over accepting any post in the new administration. Considering forming an opposition party, and criticized Karzai’s handling of the loya jirga.


26, June, 2002: Human Rights Watch urges Karzai to stop intimidation of former Woman’s Affairs minister, Dr Sima Samar (a charge of blasphemy being recently dismissed in a Kabul court).


1, July, 2002: Estimates of 30-40 killed & 60-70 wounded by an errant US bomb that landed on a village wedding party in Uruzgan province.

2, July, 2002: UN suspends operation to return refugees to northern Afghanistan due to continuing tensions between forces of Dostum and Atta Mohammad.

Karzai’s government expresses outrage over latest US bombardment of civilians.

6, July, 2002: Vice-President Haji Abdul Qadir (a Pashtun associated with the Northern Alliance, once a member of the mujahideen) assassinated. His brother Abdul Haq executed by Taleban a year ago.

7, July, 2002: Probe into assassination starts. Labeled a ‘terrorist attack’. 10,000 attend funeral. Quadir had so many enemies it is difficult to pin point a specific attacker.


10, July, 2002: Karzai considering foreign protection.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15, July, 2002</td>
<td>US have talks with Karzai on strengthening Afghan military. Government orders disbanding of private armies, though implementation unclear given governments lack of influence outside of Kabul.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18, July, 2002</td>
<td>Karzai urges émigré population to return.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21, July, 2002</td>
<td>Spokesman for Karzai rejects criticism that poor US military intelligence had led heavy civilian casualties (places number at 500). US aid group Global Exchange says 800 civilian deaths is a conservative estimate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>First battalion of Afghan troops graduate following training by US special forces. A second battalion in training by the French.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29, July, 2002</td>
<td>Department of National Security claims to have foiled an Assassination attempt—assassin believed to be Arab or Pakistani.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2, August, 2002</td>
<td>Hundreds of protestors in 4th day of demonstration against Karzai government for not installing Zadran governor of Gardez.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4, August, 2002</td>
<td>Zahir Shah moves into former palace—also occupied by Karzai.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13, August, 2002</td>
<td>Iranian President Mohammad Khatami strongly criticizes US ‘war on terror’ during visit to Afghanistan. Rejects US allegations of attempting to undermine Karzai’s government. Northern Alliance has control in government posts in defense, security, &amp; foreign affairs—build shrine over Ahmed Shah Masood’s grave site—now a point of pilgrimage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15, August, 2002</td>
<td>Karzai gives national address on radio. Focused on security and the need to build a national army. Rumsfeld calls for further international support for Afghanistan. General Franks says he expects US troops to stay in Afghanistan for years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20, August, 2002</td>
<td>Musharraf criticizes Afghan governments lack of control of tribal factions, and suggests that al-Qaeda may be re-grouping there.</td>
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