Arming the Weak: U.S. Post-Sept. 11 Arms Trade Policy  
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Introduction

The U.S. response to the terror attacks of Sept. 11 has been clear and concise: “If you’re not with us, you’re against us.” When the United States began to develop its international coalition against terrorism, the administration looked for partners who were willing and able to take part in the military, political, economic, and diplomatic efforts they deemed necessary to stamp out the terrorists and their networks. Since the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, the United States has employed as many means as possible to fight the war on terror. In one aspect, however, an alarming trend has emerged. The United States is more willing than ever to sell or giveaway high technology weapons to countries that have pledged assistance in the global war on terror, regardless of past behavior or current status. In some cases, these recipients of U.S. military goods and services are weak, failing, and failed states. Moreover, the Bush administration has expressed a willingness to provide weapons to countries that in the past have been criticized for human rights violations, lack of democracy, and even support of terrorism, even though it is a standing tenet of U.S. policy that weapon exports should not undermine long-term security and stability, weaken democratic movements, support military coups, escalate arms races, exacerbate ongoing conflicts, cause arms build-ups in unstable regions, or be used to commit human rights abuses.

This paper will detail U.S. policy since Sept. 11 with regards to arms sales and their export to weak and failing states. It will examine U.S. arms export policy and shifts in attitudes since Sept. 11. Further, it will highlight specific military assistance programs to states of concern and
global trends on arms sales, including deviation from these trends since Sept. 11. Lastly, it will
discuss why this trend could not only harm U.S. security in the long-term, but also further
weaken those already weak states that receive U.S. military assistance.

**Why Arms Sales Matter?**

In reality, one of the largest carrots in the U.S. arsenal for supporting U.S. military efforts is arms
sales and other forms of military assistance. The United States, as well as other countries,
traditionally has used arm sales to “reward” those willing to support it in conflict. Those
countries that know the United States wants something from them, particularly since Sept. 11,
often demand military goods and services for their support (Israel, Egypt, Turkey, Greece, and
Saudi Arabia are perhaps the best example of this practice in the last two decades). It is
therefore, from a consistency point of few, not all that alarming that the United States has used
arms sales as a means of garnering support for the global “war” on terror. Taken individually,
each sale or change in export policy since Sept. 11 does not represent a paradigm shift in U.S.
arms export policy. However, taken as a whole, some striking trends have emerged. The United
States new relationships with several countries have represented a dramatic shift in U.S. military
assistance policy without much significant discussion within the Administration, with Congress,
or with experts on specific regions or countries. Today, military aid is being given to some
countries the United States refused to provide arms, training, and other military assistance to
prior to Sept. 11. This paper will show that such a policy is shortsighted and could ultimately
lead to increased problems for the recipient countries, as well as the United States.
Global Trends in Arms Sales

Before highlighting specific states of concern, it is worthwhile to examine global trends in arms sales. First a caveat about the data available on arms sales. There is not one comprehensive source for global arms transfers. Moreover, varying levels of government transparency regarding arms sales makes it difficult to compare different data sets. For example, there is not even one agreed upon definition of “arms transfer” for the UN Register of Conventional Arms, the most comprehensive official government transparency regime in existence. Moreover, arms sales can be measured in terms of arms agreements (contracts) and those that are actually delivered in a particular year. These totals are often not the same, because it may take a few years for the weapons production and the sale to be completed once agreed. Various data sets use different definitions to detail individual arms sales and so the data is unfortunately, often incompatible and incomparable. That said, I will use the limited data available to highlight some of these emerging trends.

The Congressional Research Service (CRS) annual report, “Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1994-2001,” details trends in global arms transfers. The current edition, notes that the dollar value of arms agreements and deliveries fell substantially in 2001 to a seven-year low. Global arms sales, as well as those specifically in the developing world, fell this year because of “limited financial resources” due to poor economic conditions worldwide. The

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1 The CRS report defines developing nations as all countries except the United States, Russia, the European nations, Canada, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. The report examines the export of fourteen categories of conventional weapons: tanks and self-propelled guns, artillery, armored personnel carriers and armored cars, major surface combatants, minor surface combatants, submarines, guided missile patrol boats, supersonic combat aircraft, subsonic combat aircraft, other aircraft, helicopters, surface-to-air missiles, surface-to-surface missiles, and anti-ship missiles.
economic downturn has forced some countries to upgrade existing systems rather than purchase new weapons and weapons systems.

However, as with years past, worldwide, the United States still ranks first in arms transfer agreements, making nearly $12.1 billion worth of agreements in 2001 (45.8% of all agreements globally), a decrease from the 2000 level of $18.9 billion. Russia, which sold less than half of the U.S. total, was second with $5.8 billion in agreements globally (22% of the world total), down from 2000 levels of $8.4 billion. France ranked third with $2.9 billion in agreements, well below its $4.3 billion level in 2000. These three countries alone made up approximately 78.8% of the world total of arms agreements, valued at $20.8 billion (the world total was nearly $26.4 billion). From 1994-2001, the United States made $91.208 billion worth of global arms agreements, Russia made $39.9 billion, and France made $30.4 billion. Even with a poor world economic situation, it is clear that the United States is nowhere near losing its arms export supremacy.

This trend is further amplified when one looks at arms agreements with the developing world. Counter-intuitively, developing countries are the biggest purchasers of arms. These countries made 60.5% of world arms transfer agreements in 2001. The United States was the main supplier of weapons to developing countries with $7.6 billion (43.6%) of arms agreements in 2001. Russia ranked second at $5.76 billion (29.6%) and China was third with $600 million (3.8%).

Looking at a seven-year trend, arms transfer agreements with developing nations made up 68.3% of the global total. The United States made the most agreements with countries in the developing world in those seven years with $54.821 billion dollars. Russia was second with
$36.6 billion and France was third with $21.9 billion worth of agreements with the developing world.

The world total for arms deliveries was also lower in 2001 than in previous years. In 2001, global arms deliveries totaled $21.3 billion, which is far lower than the $32.6 billion in 2000. The United States led the world with arms deliveries as well. Globally, the United States made nearly $9.7 billion in deliveries (45.6%). The United Kingdom was second in global arms deliveries with $4 billion and Russia was third with $3.6 billion. These three countries delivered approximately $17.3 billion worth of weapons in 2001, 81.2% of the world total. From 1994-2001, the United States made an astounding $118.432 billion worth of weapons deliveries to countries around the world. The United Kingdom was the United States’ closest competitor with $42.2 billion and France was third with $28.4 billion worth of arms deliveries.

The United States was also first in terms of total arms deliveries to the developing nations with $6 billion (41.7%) in 2001. Russia was second with $3.4 billion (23.6%) and the United Kingdom was third with $3.3 billion (22.9%) of deliveries to the developing world. The United States makes almost twice as many deliveries as its nearest competitor. Examining data from the last seven years, the United States made $74.928 billion worth of arms deliveries to the developing world, the United Kingdom was second with $37 billion, and France was third with $23.3 billion.

Even though total arms transfer agreements fell substantially in value, arms transfer agreements with the developing world totaled almost $16 billion and made up 60.5% of the world total in
2001. Israel led the developing world in arms transfer agreements in 2001 with $2.5 billion worth of agreements. China was second in the developing world with $2.1 billion worth of agreements and Egypt was third with $2 billion. (The rest of the top ten developing countries making arms transfer agreements were Saudi Arabia, South Korea, UAE, India, Iran, Singapore, and Kuwait.) Over the past seven years, the United Arab Emirates ranked first in the value of arms agreements in the developing world with $16 billion worth of arms agreements (this included a $6.432 billion deal with the United States for 80 F-16 aircraft). Saudi Arabia was second with $14.1 billion worth of arms agreements, and China was third with $13.9 billion from 1994-2001 (rounding out the top ten in the seven year period were India with $12.4 billion, Egypt with $7.4 billion, Israel with $7.2 billion, South Korea with $5.6 billion, Pakistan with $5.6 billion, South Africa with $5.3 billion and Malaysia with $4 billion). (Authors note: While it is difficult to consider Israel, South Korea, or Singapore as developing countries (which they are no longer), the reality of the CRS data available is that such is the breakdown of states. While it would be more helpful to consider other categories of states, such as OECD, OPEC, etc., the data is currently not available under that framework).

Arms deliveries to the developing world totaled $14.4 billion in 2001, equaling 67.6% of the world’s arms deliveries. Saudi Arabia received the most arms deliveries in the developing world in 2001, with $4.8 billion in weapons. China was second with $2.2 billion in arms deliveries, and Taiwan was third with $1.2 billion. (Rounding out the top ten developing countries were Taiwan, South Korea, Egypt, Israel, India, Kuwait, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka). Since 1994, Saudi Arabia has been the largest recipient of arms deliveries with $65 billion worth of weapons. Taiwan, ranked second, received less than half that total with $20.7 billion in arms deliveries, and South
Korea was third with $9.6 billion (the rest of the top ten are Egypt with $9.1 billion, China with $8 billion, UAE with $7.7 billion, Kuwait with $7.3 billion, Israel with $6.9 billion, Malaysia with $4.2 billion, and Indonesia with $3.1 billion worth of arms deliveries). The influence of the Gulf War can clearly be seen in the top recipients of arms in the past seven years.

**Analysis**

Instead of the poor worldwide economic situation encouraging countries to spend precious resources on other pursuits, the decrease in arms agreements has led to increased competition between countries and manufacturers and has contributed to multinational mergers and joint production ventures. Experts further believe that the United States is in no danger of relinquishing its worldwide domination of the arms market, as countries will continue to rely on the United States to upgrade existing U.S.-origin systems, train and provide support services on existing systems, and sell munitions to use in previously purchased systems. There are also further expectations that former Warsaw Pact countries as well as specific countries in the Near East, Asia, and Latin America are the biggest targets for increased weapons sales in the years to come. These conditions make the changes to U.S. export policy even more alarming, as the United States is looking for new customers to continue its global domination of the arms market.

**Military Training**

The United States is not just selling the military hardware, but is also offering military training to allies in the “war” on terror. Military training is an important foreign policy tool, used by many countries, in order to transfer political ideology to foreign governments and military institutions, as well as establishing common military goals, procedures, and mechanisms. The utilization of
military training to build military and political relationships is part of an emerging trend that began at the end of the Cold War. In the last decade, the United States has trained more than 100,000 foreign police and soldiers annually. Such training programs, which take place both within the United States and in about 150 countries around the world, range from English language training, counter-narcotics strategies, and preparing forces for peacekeeping operations.

As with all things since Sept. 11, however, the focus of today’s military training program has shifted to focus on fighting terrorism. Indeed, the Bush administration has proposed an increase of 13 percent for International Military Education and Training (IMET) over this year’s budget and a 27 percent increase for Foreign Military Financing (FMF) in addition to newly planned anti-terrorism programs for foreign militaries. And, in the $27.1 billion Emergency FY’02 Supplemental Appropriations Request, $100 million is allocated for defense articles, services, and training.

Since Sept. 11, the United States has offered military training to many countries victims of terrorist activities, or struggling with the presence of terrorist networks. This training, often disguised as counter-terrorist, is often really counter-insurgency training, such as in Nepal, Colombia, and the Philippines. In March 2002, President George W. Bush emphasized the U.S. reliance on training programs when he said, “we will not send American troops to every battle, but America will actively prepare other nations for the battles ahead.”

Just as the Bush administration argues that selling weapons is crucial to developing allies, the same arguments are applied to military training. But, while military training may be beneficial in
the war on terrorism, using U.S. military training to curb terrorism in countries that themselves have negative human right records or are currently fighting internal wars may not be the most prudent of strategies. The United States may further complicate internal situations where government opposition groups are now classified as terrorist organizations, or where the war on terror is being exploited to serve national interests.

While the United States is strengthening its military relationships in an effort to widen the coalition against terrorism, mechanisms to monitor military training are becoming less transparent. In 1999, Congress passed a legislative amendment sponsored by Sen. Patrick Leahy, D-VT, prohibiting the training of foreign security forces that violate human rights and requiring DoD to prepare an annual Foreign Military Training Report (FMTR) on all military exercises and training involving foreign military troops, including data from the previous year and estimates for the current year. However, since its first edition, more and more sections of the report have become classified, making it increasingly difficult for the public to obtain information on who is being trained, where they are being trained, and for what purpose. In addition, Congress is currently debating further changing or possibly eliminating reporting requirements on military training. Without public oversight of U.S. military training programs, the U.S. military is accountable to no one but itself.

Analysis

Terrorist threats are not new in many of the countries where the United States is currently training military troops. Part of the emergency supplemental will help provide support and training for those countries deemed by the United States as under direct terrorist threats,
including Afghanistan, Bahrain, Jordan, Nepal, Oman, Pakistan, Yemen, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, the Philippines, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, Colombia, and Ecuador. While some of these countries have obvious ties to U.S. efforts to stamp out al Qaeda, with others, the United States is gambling with the idea that military training will buy allies in the long run. Military training in many instances promotes the readiness, efficiency, and effectiveness of foreign military troops. However, it may only worsen the situation in countries plagued by terror if human rights conditions are not implemented and economic and social aid are not concurrently offered to help strengthen and promote internal stability.

Post-Sept. 11 Policy Changes

Now that we have a picture of the global arms market, we have a context in which to judge changes to U.S. export policy.

Lifting Sanctions

Immediately after the Sept. 11 attacks, the Bush administration proposed allowing arms sales to countries currently ineligible to receive U.S. weapons because of sanctions due to human rights violations, lack of democracy, involvement in acts of aggression, and nuclear testing. Called the USA Patriot Act, the Bush administration had asked for 5-year general waivers in mid-September as part of its anti-terrorism bill, which stated that notwithstanding other provisions of U.S. law, the United States can provide security assistance to any country if it would help fight terrorism or promote international peace and security. Legally, U.S. arms sales are determined in accordance with the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). Being present on an
ITAR list can prohibit a country from receiving U.S. military equipment or military training. And, under current U.S. law – specifically Section 614 of the Foreign Assistance Act – the Bush administration has more than enough “wiggle room” for the President to waive existing regulations governing arms exports and sell weapons to whatever country he chooses, regardless of their human rights or democratic practices. And, if a country doesn’t have any restrictions placed upon through U.S. law or due to a UN arms embargo, the United States is free to export weapons to those countries without violating any legal provisions.

The final version of the bill did not contain this provision, however, as the Bush administration met with stiff domestic and international criticism for an across the board lifting of sanctions. As a result, decisions to lift sanctions were made on a case-by-case basis, and to date, the number of countries having their weapons bans lifted is only six. The countries that have had their sanctions lifted are: Armenia, Azerbaijan, India, Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Yugoslavia. While these countries have been identified as key allies in the global war on terror, each has troubling recent pasts, which led to them being placed on the list in the first place. Not only is each country is involved in inter and intra-state conflicts, India and Pakistan have been criticized for their evolving nuclear weapon’s programs, Pakistan’s military government attained power as a result of a coup, Azerbaijan has been embroiled in disputes with Armenia, the stability of Tajikistan remains questionable, and Yugoslavia remains unstable and a possible “hot spot” for future conflict.
Arming All “Allies”

Even losing the universal lifting of sanctions, the Bush administration remains undeterred and committed to arming potential allies in the war against terrorism with U.S. weapons as quickly as possible. On the 6-month anniversary of the Sept. 11 attacks, Bush declared that the U.S. was willing to provide training and assistance to any government facing a terrorist threat: “America encourages and expects governments everywhere to help remove the terrorist parasites that threaten their own countries and peace of the world. If governments need training, or resources to meet this commitment, America will help” (Federation of American Scientists Arms Sales Monitoring Project, www.fas.gov/asmp).

Speeding Export “Reforms”

The United States is currently undergoing a reform of the export control system. On May 22, 2000, then-President Clinton approved seventeen proposals, known as the Defense Trade Security Initiative (DTSI), that were “intended to expedite the export licensing process to improve industrial competitiveness.” The proposals, which apply only to the United States’ closest allies – NATO, Japan, and Australia – streamline the export licensing process and reduce the time necessary for industry to obtain permission to export U.S. weaponry abroad. Under DTSI, a single license for entire weapons systems would be granted, removing the need to reapply for licenses for extra components. Further, licenses would be valid for eight years instead of the current four years. Licenses for NATO efforts including those under the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) will be given expedited reviews as well. The most significant and controversial change is the extension of International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) exemptions to qualified countries. (Another proposal would review, on a four-year basis, what
weapons would be included on the ITAR munitions list.) In other words, after establishing specific security parameters including, export controls, industrial security, international agreements on end use and retransfer of defense items, countries would be granted license exemptions for unclassified weapons exports. Australia and the United Kingdom, which together account for 25% of U.S. weapons export licenses, will be the first two beneficiaries of this new policy once they meet U.S. requirements. When qualified, the two countries would enjoy the same “license free zone” as Canada does now (although, the United States has experienced difficulty in monitoring this policy for Canada, and, in fact, suspended the program in 1999 after it was revealed that Canada had re-exported U.S. weapons without U.S. approval).

The proposals were adopted with the rationale that they will allow U.S. industry to be more competitive abroad and allow companies to break into new markets previously closed to them because of export restrictions. The streamlining of the export process removes the paper trail and lessens the time spent on reviewing licenses, which reduces oversight and transparency. The blanket export approval, which eliminates the need to obtain specific licenses, raises the probability of unauthorized retransfers and facilitates U.S. weapons ending up in the hands of unintended users.

Since DTSI, other proposals from the defense industry and Pentagon have encouraged more sweeping changes, even though the General Accounting Office (GAO) has noted specific improvements in licensing times as well as increased problems with U.S. end-use monitoring. However, the GAO conclusions seem to have fallen on deaf ears. In November 2001, Lincoln Bloomfield, Asst. Sec. of State for Political-Military Affairs, speaking at an export control
conference in London stated that the United States learned from Sept. 11 that “our shared security interests demand export control regimes that will facilitate collaborative defense modernization and transnational defense industrial cooperation, so as to maximize military interoperability among allies in the future.” This can be interpreted to mean, that the United States will continue to try to lower barriers to exports in order to sell more U.S. weapons in a more expedited fashion.

Halting Specific Weapon Sales

To be fair, not all changes in U.S. arms trade policy since Sept. 11 have been in the direction of selling any and all U.S. weapons to any and all recipients as quickly as possible. The State Department has now decided to suspend the export of long-range .50 caliber sniper rifles, “weapons that can shoot accurately from approximately 2,000 yards, can shoot down aircraft, and can pierce armored vehicles, to individuals or commercial dealers because of the risk they pose to U.S. security” (www.fas.org). The State Department acted after a request from Rep. Henry Hyde, ranking minority member on the House Committee on Governmental Reform and a report from the Violence Policy Center (www.vpc.org/studies/roofone.htm) that demonstrated that in the past, U.S. arms manufacturers have transferred these rifles to individuals and groups that have been tagged as terrorists, including Osama bin Laden (www.fas.org). According to the Federation of American Scientists, the State Department had already approved the export of 75 .50 caliber rifles in the last year (though, according to government records only 16 had been delivered before the exports were suspended).
Countries of Concern

According to Lt. Cmdr. Barbara Burfeind, a Pentagon spokeswoman from the U.S. Navy, “Virtually every country but Cuba, Iraq, Iran, and the other countries on the terrorist list receive some military training or aid from us.” (“U.S. Links Military Aid to Immunity for Peacekeepers,” by Elizabeth Becker, New York Times, August 10, 2002.) Since Sept. 11, the United States has made billions of dollars worth of arms deals. For example, the United States has beefed up sales to key allies in the Middle East including: a $1.2 billion sale of fighter jets and missiles to Oman; nearly $400 million worth of missiles to Egypt; and $40 million worth of missiles to the United Arab Emirates. In addition, countries struggling internally with terrorist organizations, such as the Philippines, are set to receive large shipments of military aid, including a $92 million in weapons to the Philippines which contains 30,000 used M-16 assault rifles. And, Indonesia, which had been banned from receiving military training, is set to resume a relationship with the Pentagon as part of the new Regional Defense Counter Terrorism Fellowship Program, a new DoD program that is not subject to training limitations contained in the annual Foreign Operations legislation. Even close NATO allies, such as Turkey, are benefiting from the weapons free-for-all. Turkey is now set to receive 14 Sea Hawk naval helicopters, even though it has been accused of questionable human rights practices, and other recent helicopter deals have been delayed as a result of such concerns.

The United States has been careful not to alienate countries based on some of these weapon decisions. To offset global political backlash on some weapon announcements, the United States has decided to arm both sides of a conflict. Both India and Pakistan are in negotiations to
receive large military aid packages. Further, in direct response to the lifting of sanctions to Azerbaijan, Armenia was $4.3 in military aid and training.

These sales represent only the beginning. Just as it took time after the Gulf War for arms exports to increase to Middle East allies, the real explosion in arms sales will occur in the next few years. Agreements may be made in the short term, but granting of export licenses (which are good for a four year period) and actual arms deliveries will be a longer term process and a legacy the United States will live with for decades to come.

But what specific countries are benefiting from the policy changes in U.S. arms export policy that are relevant to our discussion of state failure. Rotberg argues that there are seven failed states that exist today: Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Sudan (“Failed States in a World of Terror, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2002, Volume 81 No. 4, pg. 133). But, he also believes that there are over twenty-four states that are in states of perpetual weakness, including Haiti, Chad, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Fiji, the Solomon Islands, Tajikistan, Lebanon, Nigeria, Niger, Burkina Faso, Kenya, Indonesia, Colombia, Sri Lanka, and Zimbabwe (“The New Nature of Nation-State Failure,” The Washington Quarterly, Summer 2002, pg. 93.)

Certainly, Colombia is the obvious choice for an examination of U.S. military aid. Since Sept. 11, the fine line between counter-insurgency and counter-narcotics operations has been blurred in order to make Colombia “fit” into U.S. strategy for assisting those countries threatened by terrorism. Indeed, President Bush highlighted this change in perspective, when he recently
requested $98 million in military training and helicopters for the Colombian Army to protect a vital oil pipeline that has been repeatedly damaged by rebel groups. The FY’02 Emergency Supplemental includes language that links drug trafficking to terrorism in Colombia, thus providing the Colombian government with funds, weapons and training to help the military and police fight the guerillas, embroiling the United States further into Colombia’s civil war.

But, since Colombia is being discussed in detail in other papers prepared for this conference, for the purposes of this paper, five states were selected for further examination to judge the potential for increased failure based on new arms agreements. These states were selected because of their physical location (all are either adjacent or in close proximity to Afghanistan – the initial focus of the U.S. “war” on terror), each is a Muslim state, and each has experienced a dramatic shift in U.S. military support since Sept. 11. The five countries are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Yemen.

For each country, I have outlined the context of the political situation, the type of government, the human rights situation, the infant mortality rate, the military expenditures, the amount spent on conventional arms transfers, and the total armed forces. Infant mortality, democracy, and trade openness have been identified as most important indicators of state failure by the State Failure Project (see Gurr et al). I chose these above issues because they are all variables that are also of concern to existing restrictions on arms sales.

Further, to understand the categories of military assistance provided by the United States, the following descriptions may be useful:
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) are government-to-government sales negotiated by the Pentagon. “In addition to the weapons, the Pentagon usually contracts to deliver the goods, provide training in the operation and maintenance of the weapon, supply spare parts and give performance assurances. The military articles being sold through this program can come from either Pentagon stocks or new production. In the latter case, the Defense Department contracts with U.S. arms manufacturers to actually build the weapons and, in some cases, provide related services. But the Pentagon takes care of all of the paperwork.”

Excess Defense Articles (EDA) are surplus or obsolete U.S. weapons that are given away for free or at a dramatically reduced cost to foreign governments.

Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) are “negotiated by US companies and foreign buyers, without the involvement of the Pentagon.”

Foreign Military Financing (FMF) is “Congressionally appropriated grants given to foreign governments to finance the purchase of American-made weapons, services and training. Since 1950, the US government has provided over $91 billion in FMF to militaries around the world. The vast majority of these funds goes to Israel and Egypt to reward them for making a cold peace in 1979.”
(http://www.fas.org/asmp/profiles/aid/aidindex.htm#Budget%20Requests)

The Economic Support Fund (ESF) is a program established by Congress “to promote economic and political stability in strategically important regions where the United States has special security interests. The funds are provided on a grant basis and are available for a variety of economic purposes, like infrastructure and development projects. Although not intended for military expenditure, these grants allow the recipient government to free up its own money for military programs.”
(http://www.fas.org/asmp/profiles/aid/aidindex.htm#Budget%20Requests)

International Military Education and Training (IMET) “grants are given to foreign governments to pay for professional education in military management and technical training on US weapons systems. Over 2,000 courses are offered, including some on human rights and civil-military relations. This program is said by its proponents to promote positive military-to-military contacts, thereby familiarizing foreign officers with "US values and democratic processes," though critics argue there is too much emphasis on military skills and not enough on human rights. The Expanded IMET program offered to certain states only focuses on the latter.”
(http://www.fas.org/asmp/profiles/aid/aidindex.htm#Budget%20Requests)

Non-Proliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR) “provides resources in support of a variety of security-related foreign policy objectives. Funds go to nuclear non-proliferation programs, anti-terrorism aid, demining activities, and - a new item in FY 2001 - small arms destruction programs.”
(http://www.fas.org/asmp/profiles/aid/aidindex.htm#Budget%20Requests)
The Freedom Support Act (FSA) was passed in Congress on October 24, 1992 with the goal of providing the states of the former Soviet Union funds that support free market and democratic reforms through demilitarization, humanitarian and technical assistance. The bill particularly endorses American investment and trade through enterprise funds, small business programs and access to credits for purchases of U.S. food exports. The FSA also provides funding for nuclear nonproliferation programs and activities, as well as the dismantlement and destruction of biological, chemical and conventional weapons, and humanitarian aid, including health and human services programs. After Sept.11, the FSA was amended to authorize the waiver of restrictions on FSA funding for Azerbaijan. (102nd Congress, 2nd Session, Public Law 102-511, Section 907 passed in Congress on October 24, 1992)

Armenia

Since 1998, Armenia has been involved in an undeclared war with Azerbaijan over the autonomous republic of Nagorno-Karabakh. While peace negotiations have been undertaken, the conflict has not been resolved and the Armenian government, which denies any direct military involvement, remains embroiled in Nagorno-Karabakh (www.child-soldiers.org). Armenia, a republic, has been criticized for a poor human rights record, although the State Department’s 2001 report does note improvements. According to the 2001 report, Armenia has experienced deaths in police custody and in the military due to mistreatment, arbitrary arrest and detention continue, prison conditions can be life-threatening, despite improvements, and the Armenian government did not often investigate alleged abuses by members of the military and security forces, allowing impunity to be widespread. In addition, Armenia’s government does not respect conditions of privacy and due process. Freedom of the press is also limited in Armenia, as is freedom of association, religious freedom, and worker’s rights. The State Department report also documents violence against women, trafficking in women and girls, government and social discrimination against women, the disabled, and religious and ethnic minorities (www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/201/eur/8221pf.htm).

Since Sept. 11, Armenia has been on the receiving end of U.S. generosity for weapons and training. Armenia was one of the six countries that had U.S. sanctions against it removed. In reality, Armenia’s military aid since Sept. 11 could be interpreted solely in order to placate Armenia, since military aid was increasing to Azerbaijan. As a result, Congress appropriated $4.3 million in military assistance for FY’02. This trend appears to be continuing into 2003 as well. In the FY’03 Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, Armenia has been promised no less than $3 million for FMF, which had a previous total of zero. In addition, Armenia has been promised $750,000 for IMET, which had been zero prior to this fiscal year.

Azerbaijan

Azerbaijan has been involved in a conflict with Armenia over the Azeri republic of Nagorno-Karabakh, but which is under the military control of Armenia. Azerbaijan has approximately a
million refugees and a large population of internally displaced people (www.child-soldiers.org). Azerbaijan is a republic with a documented poor human rights record. In the most recent report, the State Department described how Azerbaijan did not support the democratic governance process, prison inmates and detainees died during attention, police were accused of implementing torture and force to extract confessions, the government continued to hold political prisoners, and prison conditions remained life threatening. Moreover, the report detailed limits on freedom of speech, press, freedom of assembly and association, harassment of religious minorities, and limits on worker’s rights. Azerbaijan also experienced violence and discrimination against women and religious and ethnic minorities, as well as trafficking in persons (www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2001/eur/8225pf.htm).

Azerbaijan’s infant mortality rate was 83.08 per 1000 live births in 2001 (CIA World Factbook 2001). According to SIPRI, the UN Arms Register and the Human Development Report, Azerbaijan had no arms imports in the last ten years. Azerbaijan has an armed force totaling 72,000 soldiers (Human Development Report 2002) and a military expenditure of $121 million in 1999, or 2.6% of GDP (CIA World Factbook 2001).

Prior to Sept. 11, Azerbaijan had been under U.S. sanctions since 1993. However, the country did receive $513,227 in 2001 in military training, according to the Foreign Military Training Report (www.fas.org/asmp/campaigns/trainign/FMTT2002/Index.htm). Azerbaijan did not receive any U.S. weapons between 1990-2001, except for $38,000 in Direct Commercial Sales deliveries in 1996 (although $541,000 had been licensed in 1996). In 1997, Azerbaijan was granted $6000 worth of DCS, but no weapons were ever delivered as part of this licensing.
Since Sept. 11, Azerbaijan has been the beneficiary of lifted U.S. sanctions. In the 2001 emergency supplemental bill passed immediately after Sept. 11, Azerbaijan received $3 million non-proliferation, anti-terrorism, demining and related programs (NADR) funding and was promised an additional $3.23 million in NADR funding for FY’03. The NADR funding is part of a $45.5 million fund for “specialized training and equipment to prevent and respond to terrorist incidents” (FY’01 Emergency Supplemental). The funding also includes the $42.2 million allocated for military training and equipment for border security forces in Central Asia. Azerbaijan was allotted $4 million in FMF in FY’02 and promised $3 million for FMF in FY’03. Moreover, Azerbaijan has been allocated $750,000 for IMET in FY’03. Azerbaijan has also been appropriated $46 million as part of the FSA.

Tajikistan

Tajikistan’s five-year civil war ended in June 1997, but even a UN Observer mission (UNMOT) and CIS Collective Peacekeeping Forces have not brought stability to Tajikistan. Widespread armed opposition groups have been active throughout the country and the implementation of the peace accords has been delayed. In January 2001, the governments of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan agreed to take joint action against Islamist opposition movements in Central Asia (www.child-soldiers.org).

Tajikistan is a republic that suffers from a poor human rights record. In 2001, the State Department reported that members of the security forces had been responsible for extra-judicial killings, kidnappings, disappearances, torture, abuse, threats, extortion, looting, and civilian
abuse. The Tajik government is accused of arresting and imprisoning citizens for political reasons and few prosecutions have resulted from the above abuses, creating an atmosphere of impunity. Poor prison conditions, pretrial detention, infringements of rights to privacy, speech, assembly, the press, religion, and movement were widespread and common. Vulnerable populations also faced discrimination, abuse, and harassment, including women, persons with disabilities, and religious and ethnic minorities. Children are subject to child labor conditions and both women and children are trafficked in Tajikistan. Former opposition groups and paramilitary groups were also accused of serious abuses by the State Department, including killings, abductions, threats, and extortion. (www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2001/eur/8353pf.htm)

Conditions remain poor in Tajikistan for women and young children as well. The infant mortality rate was an astonishing 116.09 in 1000 live births in 2001 (CIA World Factbook). Tajikistan had no arms imports between 1990-2000 according to SIPRI, the UN Arms Register and the Human Development report. Tajikistan has a small armed forces with only 6,000 soldiers, and spends only $17 million a year, 1.8% of its GDP on the military (CIA World Factbook).

Prior to Sept. 11, Tajikistan did not receive any U.S. military assistance – no arms or training, except for $383,687 in 2001 in military training, according to the Foreign Military Training Report 2002. The United States did not sell any weapons or grant any licenses from 1990-2001. Since Sept. 11, however, the United States has embraced Tajikistan as an arms importer. In the FY’01 Emergency Supplemental, Tajikistan was granted $7.5 million in NADR funding. In the FY’02 Foreign Operations Supplemental Funding Request, Tajikistan was granted $3 million in FMF and $37 million in Freedom Support Act funding. Additionally in FY’03, Tajikistan has
been allotted $350,000 in IMET funding and $50,000 in NADR and $22.5 million in Freedom Support Act funding. Tajikistan’s NADR funding is part of the larger $45.5 million NADR fund for “specialized training and equipment to prevent and respond to terrorist incidents” (FY’01 Emergency Supplemental) and $42.2 million allocated for military training and equipment for border security forces in Central Asia.

Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan is plagued with armed opposition groups seeking to establish an Islamic state tied to neighboring conflicts in Chechnya, Afghanistan, Tajikistan and Xinjiang. As stated above, Central Asian states agreed to work together to combat these opposition groups in January 2001 (www.child-soldiers.org). Uzbekistan is technically a republic, but the political situation is such that it is effectively under authoritarian presidential rule with little power outside the executive branch. In its 2001 report, the State Department stated that Uzbekistan’s human rights record is very poor. Democratic processes are prohibited, security and police forces are responsible for serious abuses, deaths, and torture. The judicial system in Uzbekistan is in terrible shape, as citizens are arbitrarily and prolongy detained, illegal searches and wiretaps are common, and due process is not ensured. Impunity is rampant in Uzbekistan, censorship is widely practiced, limits on assembly, association, and religion are regular, and local organizations are prohibited. In addition, the State Department reports widespread domestic violence and violence against women, discrimination of women and minorities in the workplace, and child labor in the rural areas. Trafficking of women and children to other countries for prostitution is also a problem (www.state.giv/g/drl/hrrpt/2001/eur/8366pf.htm).
Uzbekistan’s infant mortality rate was 71.92 per 1000 live births in 2001 (CIA World Factbook). Uzbekistan did not report any arms transfer to the UN Arms Register, and SIPRI did not account for any arms sales in the recent past, but according to the Human Development Report, Uzbekistan did import $5 million in U.S. weapons in 2001. Uzbekistan’s military expenditure was $200 million in FY 1997, amounting for only 2% of its GDP.

Prior to Sept. 11, Uzbekistan did receive a minimal amount of U.S. military assistance. Between 1990-1995, there were no U.S. military transfers to Uzbekistan. Between 1995-2001, Uzbekistan was granted a total of $2.7 million in IMET and $7.65 million in FMF. During those same years, Uzbekistan also received $442,316 in DCS licenses, but only received $10,000 in DCS weapons, in addition to $2.4 million in FMS equipment.

Since Sept. 11, Uzbekistan has been identified as a key partner for U.S. efforts to stamp out terrorism and it’s complicated networks throughout Central Asia. In the FY’01 Emergency Supplemental, Uzbekistan received $25 million in FMF for defense services and equipment, $40.5 million in FSA funding for economic and law enforcement assistance, and $18 million in NADR, which is part of the $45.5 million fund for “specialized training and equipment to prevent and respond to terrorist incidents” (FY’01 Emergency Supplemental) and $42.2 million allocated for military training and equipment for border security forces in Central Asia. In March 2002, the United States signed a joint five-part declaration with Uzbekistan that outlined practical goals for cooperation in an effort to stabilize the Central Asian region. In the FY’02 Supplemental Appropriations Request, Uzbekistan was granted $11 million in FMF and $34.5 million in FSA funding. However, Uzbekistan will only receive this funding if the U.S.
Secretary of State determines that Uzbekistan is making “substantial and continuing progress” in meeting its commitments under the joint declaration from March 2002 (it is unclear if there will be harsh judging of Uzbekistan’s record, or if this provision is a rubber-stamp process, much like certification in Colombia has become). In the FY’03 Foreign Operations Act, Uzbekistan is poised to receive $8.75 million in FMF and $1.2 million in IMET, $1.2 million in NADR, and $31.5 million in FSA funding – all with the stipulation that Uzbekistan continues to meet its joint declaration commitments.

Yemen

Yemen remains entrenched in instability, even though North and South Yemen were unified in 1980. Unification was undermined by a brief civil war in 1984. Today, the government maintains a unified country, but is plagued with ongoing intra-tribal warfare, kidnappings and other sabotage committed by local Islamist movements. Yemen has also suffered from border disputes with Eritrea over the Hanish islands in the Red Sea and Saudi Arabia over islands to the north of Yemen (www.child-soldiers.org). Yemen is currently a republic with a mixed rating on human rights. While the State Department recognized the government’s general respect of human rights and did continue to improve on its practice, there remain serious problems within Yemen. The 2001 Human Rights Report reveals that there are serious hindrances to democratic governance processes and significant numbers of killings by security forces, which are also responsible for torture, arbitrary arrests, and detentions. These security officers also monitor civilian population activities, search their homes, detain, and mistreat detainees. The Yemeni government has also been accused of judicial corruption, inefficiency and executive interference, as well as restrictions on freedom of speech, press, religion, and movement. Women and
children are particularly vulnerable in Yemen, suffering from violence, discrimination, female genital mutilation, and child labor. Other minorities, such as religious, ethnic, and those with disabilities are also victims of harassment.

Yemen’s infant mortality rate is 68.53 per 100 live births. Yemen does not participate in the UN Register of Conventional Arms, but SIPRI reported that it has received main battle tanks (Czech Republic and Russia) and landing crafts and ships (Poland) in 1999 and 2000. The Human Development Report totals all imports by Yemen to total $33 million in 2001. Yemeni armed forces total 66,000 troops and its military expenditure was $414 million in 1999 equaling 7.6% of its GDP.

Prior to Sept. 11, Yemen was a recipient of U.S. military assistance, but received no FMF funding. Between 1990-2001, Yemen received $1.3 million in IMET funding. In addition, Yemen received $16 million in DCS licenses and received $2.5 million worth of DCS weapons and $11 million in FMS equipment, during the same period.

After Sept. 11, Yemen has been identified as a necessary partner in the Middle East. In the FY’02 Supplemental Appropriations Request, Yemen $20 million in FMF, $5 million in Economic Support Fund (ESF) financing, and a portion of $10 million in NADR funding for the Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP) for border control that is being granted to 14 countries. In FY’03, Yemen has been promised $2 million in FMF, $10 million in ESF, $650,000 in IMET, and $915,000 in NADR.
Analysis

As clear from the descriptions above, there has been a remarkable shift in U.S. policy with regards to military assistance with these five states. The Washington Post on August 27 describes “U.S. policy in Central Asia since Sept. 11 as ‘enhanced engagement’.” But as clear from the description of each of the five’s human rights conditions, the United States is choosing to dramatically increase its connections to questionable regimes. Moreover, these republics “lack the most basic tools of nationhood – a banking system, for example, or a defense ministry, or a postal service.” (Kaiser, Robert G., “U.S. Plants Footprints in Shaky Central Asia,” Washington Post, August 27, 2002, page A1).

While the dollar value of the increased support for these countries is minimal (especially when you compare it to the billions of dollars in military assistance to countries like Israel and Egypt), the shift from nothing to something is significant. For the most part, no other country was selling these countries weapons and training their militaries. The U.S. defense industry often relies on initial sales in order to make the most money, on new parts, maintenance, consulting, upgrades, etc. These sales represent only the beginning of U.S. military and defense industry ties with Central Asia. Under the guise of the “war on terrorism”, these normally undesirable bedfellows have gotten their feet in the door and will maintain a long-term relationship with the United States.
Why Current Policy Changes Make No Sense

Quid Pro Quo Rewards Bad Actors

Since Sept. 11, the United States appears eager to ensure the friendship of countries around the world. The basis for offering weapons (either sold or given away) seems to be a kind of quid pro quo. Many countries desire military upgrades in exchange for intelligence sharing, use of bases and airspace, as well as loyalty. But, providing weapons to countries that have been on the U.S. blacklist for poor human rights records, consistently harboring and supporting terrorism, and those involved in military coups, undermine the very principles the United States stands for – freedom, justice, and democracy. Moreover, such a policy rewards bad actors and sends the message that the United States will forgive past sins (and perhaps look aside later), as long as the effort to hunt down al Qaeda takes center stage.

The U.S. Already Dominates the Global Arms Market

The old adage that if we don’t sell arms someone else will also does not apply in these situations. Countries want American weapons, and for the most part, have not purchased any weapons at all in the last decade. If they have to in the short-term, they will buy from France or Russia, or even China, but if they had their first choice it would be to “buy American.” None of these countries have economies that appear to be on the upswing, and in reality, new weapons systems are not what these countries need, or can afford, right now. The United States is in no danger of losing its arm sales supremacy, or being forced out of the market by foreign competitors. Although arm sales are falling, defense contractors are making more money today than before September 11 and that trend will only continue in the future. The United States does not need arm sales to cement their place in the global arms market – it is already pretty well stuck.
Getting Entrenched in Other Countries’ Civil Strife

One of the dangers of the shifting military relationships is the making of all kinds of counter-insurgency efforts fit into the definition of counter-terrorism. According to Menkhaus, “a far more insidious problem, one which lurks in the chaotic corners of many failed states where our war on terrorism is likely to lead us, is the “quid pro no” scenario. That is, we will be drawn into providing military and economic aid to “allies” who are happy to help us fight a war on terrorism—but who have no intention of seeing that war won. The war on terrorism, for some, is to be a war without end.” (Ken Menkhaus, “'Warlordism' and the War on Terrorism,” Foreign Policy in Focus, December 26, 2001) In some cases, countries that are establishing military ties with the United States are doing so in order to rely on U.S. military know-how to prolong and fight their own internal struggles.

And, as Menkhaus also points out, countries that have not been on the receiving end of U.S. arms exports because of previous bad behavior are making public gestures to show their commitment to the U.S. goals of stomping out terrorism. These countries are trying to “convince” the United States of their good intentions, even with evidence to the contrary. “Leaders of some of these failed states have already been quick to appreciate the new and tantalizing opportunities for windfall profits that a war on terrorism could bring. The self-declared "transitional national government" of Somalia, for instance, quickly established an "anti-terrorist task force" following September 11 and has repeatedly called for external aid to prevent that failed state from being misused as a safe haven for terrorists. Never mind that the transitional authorities have been unable even to open the seaport and airport of Mogadishu, much less monitor and combat terrorism countrywide. For these leaders of failed states, the war on terrorism promises the return
of cold war levels of foreign aid and all the opportunities for personal enrichment that entails.”
(Ken Menkhaus, “‘Warlordism’ and the War on Terrorism,” Foreign Policy in Focus, December 26, 2001)

Blowback
A policy of arming so called allies for the near term seems shortsighted, and indeed could put U.S. troops and civilians at risk, if these weapons are used by those that intend to harm the United States – known as “blowback”. The United States is, in many cases, arming countries that have shaky records on democracy, human rights, and for the purposes of a discussion about blowback, loyalty. The United States does not want to have today’s transfers be used against U.S. troops in the near future, as was the case with Iraq and Afghanistan during the last decade. The United States should learn from its past mistakes and avoid arming countries now that we can’t predict will be our allies in the future.

Other Policy Options
The problems with U.S. policy are clear. But, what other options does the United States have besides building or strengthening military assistance to obtain allies in the “war” on terror. The possibilities are far-reaching, but for the purposes of our discussion, I will mention four.

Multi-lateral Solutions
First are multi-lateral solutions that develop cooperative and collaborative strategies to address the needs of each situation and use their comparative advantages for getting things done. Rotberg and other experts claim that state failure can be prevented by international political will and that states can only be strengthened through “long-term commitment by outsiders to building
capacities, strengthening security, and developing human resources.” (Rotberg, Failed States in a World of Terror, pg. 138).

In general, preventive diplomacy will only work if states develop strategies that address the reasons states fail initially, including economic disparity, political corruption, and proliferation of weapons. Such strategies must be made in concert with targeted financial and developmental assistance and provision of adequate security to allow such assistance to make it to those aspects of society that need strengthening and rebuilding.

For states to reconstruct failing or weak states the factors for failure must be taken into consideration and programs must be implemented that rebuild the elements of the state that have been destroyed. Police, judicial, and civil society institutions must be rebuilt in order to create an environment of sustainable human security. Strengthening civil society institutions means rebuilding official government institutions as well as securing zones for specialized interest groups to operate. Specific steps that multi-lateral efforts can undertake include: establishing a police force; training local administrators; developing or reintroducing legal codes and methods; supporting the economy; disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating combatants; and collecting and destroying weapons. (Rotberg, Failed States in a World of Terror, pg. 138) In order for states to deliver adequate security, roads must be made safe for travelers and commerce. Programs must help reestablish the rule of law, including a functioning court system, with effective police personnel, judges, bureaucrats, and parliamentarians, as well as restructured defense forces.
Provide Stabilizing Assistance

The United States is not limited by the option of either selling arms or losing a potential ally. But, experts agree that the United States cannot rely only on military means to solve the problems in failing and weak states or as part of the strategy to fight the “war” on terror. “President George W. Bush must still dread ‘nation-building’ but the United States should support such efforts fully in the cases of Afghanistan, Burundi, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Sudan – indeed, wherever terror can easily find a home.” (Rotberg, Failed States in a World of Terror, pg. 137)

Indeed, the United States can pursue other means of forging relationships beyond military hardware. If a country requires or desires assistance in return for allegiance, the United States would be better served by delivering social, humanitarian and economic assistance. The United States should and could send these countries – particularly those in the developing world – resources they really need – those that strengthen democracy and support infrastructures that create an unfriendly environment for terrorist elements and those conditions that cause states to fail.

Destroy Surplus Weapons

Another option, instead of only increasing the supply of weapons worldwide, would be for the United States to work with other countries, or unilaterally, to destroy excess weapons in conflict areas and reduce stockpiles of obsolete and surplus weapons in government arsenals (as they are doing with small arms stocks in countries like Macedonia, Liberia, and Albania). That way, if the United States does chose to sell new weapons to these countries, they could at least ensure
that older weapons don’t end up in the hands of the highest bidder. The current Foreign
Operations Act has $4 million budgeted for small arms destruction programs. This is a small,
but essential amount of money that can be used to prevent countless deaths and monetary
damages.

*Improve End-Use Monitoring*

If the United States continues to build connections to states of concern and increases weapons
exports to these countries, then the United States must at least improve end-use monitoring.
When the United States began air-strikes in Afghanistan in October 2001, U.S. planes were
threatened by Stinger missiles that had been provided to the mujahidin by the United States in
the 1980s. Since at least the mid-1990s, the use of legally exported U.S. weaponry to bomb and
burn Kurdish villages in southeastern Turkey has been documented. Turkish forces have also
used U.S.-supplied light weaponry in specific human rights violations, ranging from torture to
indiscriminate firing on civilians. The current U.S. end-use monitoring (EUM) system prevents
the United States from predicting where U.S. weapons will end up or how they will eventually be
used.

While the United States has some of the most comprehensive export control and end-use
provisions codified in law, current efforts to monitor U.S. arms exports are insufficient. Today,
EUM is centered on an initial license application review, which ensures that U.S. weapons are
exported to certified end-users, but does not place a similar emphasis on what happens to those
exports once they are shipped. That means that countries with worrisome human rights records,
evidence of poor weapons security management, and those that have active terrorist groups operating within their borders, still receive U.S. weaponry.

**Conclusion**

As the Bush administration weighs its military options, U.S. export law should not be given an end-run simply because the U.S. is “at war.” The regulations in the Foreign Assistance Act and Arms Export Control Act were developed to ensure that U.S. weapons went into the hands of only desirable actors. The principles supporting U.S. export law are still relevant, irrespective of the ongoing coalition building.

The long-standing U.S. policy, mentioned at the beginning of this paper, that weapon exports should not undermine security and stability, weaken democracy, support military coups, escalate arms races, exacerbate ongoing conflicts, cause arms build-ups in unstable regions, or be used to commit human rights abuses, were not made lightly. All of these criteria are still in the U.S. interest. The United States should want now, more than ever, to limit the quantity of U.S. weapons in circulation. The U.S. government already has problems with the effectiveness of the end-use monitoring system designed to ensure that exports do not fall into the wrong hands. Weapons, especially small arms – those that will be particularly useful for any ground invasion of Afghanistan or attempts to “uproot” terror networks – are difficult to control once they leave U.S. borders. The risk of diversion, especially for light weapons, is incredibly high. It is not infeasible to believe that any weapons sent to Pakistan or India might be used in the conflict between the two countries over Kashmir, and eventually might fall into the hands of Osama bin Laden’s many followers in Pakistan. Moreover, weapons sent to Armenia or Azerbaijan will
likely make their way into the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. The United States simply cannot afford to provide mass quantities of weapons abroad and do nothing but hope they will be used properly in the end.

It makes no sense to throw out arms export practices that have served well for so long in a moment of passion and fear. The core values and principles underlying current restrictions on arms transfers still make sense. It would be illogical to exempt human rights abusers or harborers of terrorists, who may, for this moment, be “on our side.” Just like in Afghanistan, we can’t predict whose side they may be on tomorrow.
## ANNEX
### CASE STUDY PROFILES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Govt. Type</th>
<th>Infant Mortality Rate (per 1,000 live births)</th>
<th>Total Armed Forces (thousands)</th>
<th>Military Exp. US$ (millions)</th>
<th>Military Exp. % GDP</th>
<th>Imports/Conventional Arms Transfers US$ (millions)</th>
<th>Human Rights Record</th>
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<td>$414 (FY99)</td>
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### United Nations Register of Conventional Arms

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**SOURCES:**
- CIA Factbook 2001
- Human Development Report 2002
- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) 2001, Appendix 5C Register of the transfers and licensed production of major conventional weapons
- United Nations Register of Conventional Arms
- U.S. Department of State Human Rights Report 2001- Released March 4, 2002