I. Introduction

Even in states that are, by most standards, flourishing, the demand for public security often exceeds the capacity of states to provide it. So it is that throughout most of the world, the state no longer has a monopoly on policing. Bayley and Shearing (1996; 2001) speak of the multilateralization of policing, by which they mean the variety of institutional forms, public, private, non-profit, and hybrid, by which policing is delivered. Some of these may be explicit instruments of policy, while others may operate more or less spontaneously, driven by market forces.

One might therefore speak of the “governance of security” to refer to the constellation of institutions, whether formal or informal, governmental or private, commercial or voluntary, that provide for social control and conflict resolution, and that attempt to promote peace in the face of threats (either realized or anticipated) that arise from collective life.

Whether a state is “weakening” or whether formal institutions have ceased to exist and the state can be deemed to have failed, social control and conflict resolution still happen. To be sure, there will be less of them in a collapsed state, but what there is, is real.

Our goal is to identify means of strengthening social control and conflict resolution in weak and failing states. We begin by discussing the governance of public security in stronger states, and by seeking institutional arrangements that might be transplanted. We seek also to suggest how new institutions might be invented in settings where conventional state institutions of security may be in decline, or nonexistent.

By identifying new mechanisms for the governance of security, it may be possible to arrest the deterioration of states, or at least provide for a modicum of internal security.

II. The Governance of Security in Advanced Industrial Societies

Since their invention by Sir Robert Peel in 1829, public police began to cultivate an image of omnipresence and omnicompetence. While this may have been credible at some places and at some times, it is now illusory. Nowhere is the finite capacity of public police more boldly evident than in the growth of the private security industry in western industrial societies, where private security officers now outnumber public police by a factor of at least three to one (for a recent review see Bayley and Shearing, 2001). Governments of various political
persuasions have consciously sought to shift much of the burden of crime control back to the private individual. The apposite if awkward term “responsibilization” has been used by O’Malley and Palmer (1996) and by Garland (1996) in this regard. An important consequence of this has been a growing inequality of access to services and inequalities in the distribution of human rights (Bayley and Shearing 1996).

The public/private dichotomy is itself illusory, with a number of commentators noting the emergence of various forms of public-private interface and hybrid institutional forms (Marx 1987; Hoogenboom 1991; Johnston 1992; Bayley and Shearing 1996, 2001).

Marx (1987) for example, referred to five trends in criminal investigations:

- Joint public-private investigations
- Public agents hiring or delegating authority to private police
- Private interests hiring public police
- New organizational forms in which the distinction between public and private is blurred; and
- The circulation of personnel between the public and private sector

This organizational differentiation itself arises from the inability of public police agencies to be everywhere and to do everything with their own personnel and their own resources.

Today in the world’s more affluent nations, a great deal of public life occurs on private property. The most common example is that of the large shopping malls of North America. Much of the policing of this space is done by private organizations under contract to the property owner. Another fact of life in many nations is the so-called “gated community” whether vertical or horizontal, where access and egress are controlled by security personnel. Ironically, such “modern” developments are referred to as representing a “refeudalization” of society.

While no one would suggest that public law enforcement agencies are an endangered species, the resource constraints under which they operate are real, and almost certainly likely to persist. The fundamental challenge then is how best to resource public security in general, and public policing in particular.

One of us (Grabosky 1996) has attempted to identify the various legal and administrative strategies by which public law enforcement agencies may harness private interests in furtherance of their mission. These are summarized briefly at Appendix A. While most of these are applicable in situations where the state is in relative good health, the role private parties and market orderings will be proportionately greater in weak states.
Where they exist, public police will continue to seek means of engaging private institutions in furtherance of their mission. It is therefore essential to ask: whose interests are served by a particular mode of police/private interface? (Bayley and Shearing, 1996; 2001).

At its most basic, one can identify three interests which might be served by a given exchange relationship: the interest of the private party to exchange, the (public) police service, and that of the general public.

**III. Opportunities in Weak and Failing States**

If we take as a starting point Black’s general theory of law (Black 1976) we can expect that, all else equal, the strength of a society’s formal legal institutions will vary inversely with the strength of its informal institutions of social control.

In dysfunctional and failed states, a variety of non-governmental institutions may already exist whose resources and energies might be harnessed in furtherance of public security. Not all of these will be equally and universally appropriate. First, an institution must possess the capacity to deliver the desired outcome. Second, even if it commands the requisite capacity, the institution must be compatible with the culture in which it operates.

Elsewhere (Grabosky 2000), one of us has identified a variety of institutional forms that may serve as the vehicles for the delivery of health services for the purpose of violence prevention in developing countries. These include

- Military
- Police
- Prisons
- Private enterprise, large and small
- Community organizations and voluntary associations
- Education
- Religious institutions
- Traditional health practitioners
- Medical professionals

One will quickly notice that many of these are as likely to be part of the solution as part of the problem. But in many settings, at least some of these institutions can play a constructive role.

There are those states in serious decline that nevertheless are endowed with attractive resources and that serve as attractive sites for domestic or foreign investors. Many such investors, with significant assets to protect, will rely upon
their own security arrangements. Whether these provide a “diffusion of benefits effect”, providing some degree of protection to neighboring communities, or displace risk to interests less able to protect themselves, is a significant question.

In a number of less advantaged nations whose authorities lack the capacity or inclination to control copyright and trademark infringement, copyright owners or their industry associations may play a leading role in the investigation and prosecution of piracy cases.

Large mining companies that operate in remote areas may engage the services of local interests or of multinational private security firms to protect their assets. Some large multinationals, will engage the services of local police and military institutions. Others will contract in private security services. Johnston (2000) provides a useful overview of such arrangements.

At the best of times, these arrangements may provide a modicum of security for neighboring residents, as well as medical, welfare and infrastructure services, employment, and other assistance for community development.

At the worst of times, they may contribute to repression, to the exacerbation of local conflict, or to other undesirable outcomes such as substance abuse and sexually transmitted disease. Appropriation of land and other resources, environmental degradation and the displacement of populations without satisfactory compensation is not likely to win hearts and minds.

Whilst activity occurring in such remote locations may not always be transparent, some contribution towards accountability may be provided by human rights NGOs such as Community Aid Abroad, or other “social auditors”.

**IV. New Institutional Configurations for Public Security**

In the developed world, new styles of governance have been characterized by a diffusion of responsibilities previously monopolized by the state, such as policy formulation and implementation. These two activities have been disconnected and distributed among networks of public, private and hybrid institutions.

Thus, while the identification of needs and formulation of policies is done under a range of auspices that include government agencies, civil society and economic interests, the requisite services can be provided by private and public actors under a variety of arrangements including those described in Appendix A (Grabosky 1996, Bayley and Shearing 2001). In this conceptual framework, any combination is conceivable and is amenable to trial and experimentation in response to particular needs.
In contrast to the weak state model, where the disintegration of governmental institutions results from a combination of factors (controllable or otherwise) and policy failures, these new configurations can be construed as a product of strong states’ adaptive capabilities to the pressures of globalization (Pierre and Peters 2000). These contextual disparities should not be minimized, but the versatility of the theoretical tool presented here may be used to model -- the sometimes chaotic -- provision of public security in weak states with greater accuracy.

In weak states, the decay of public and private institutions might limit the number of permutations possible, but the principles remain essentially the same. The three main auspices that can be identified are the state, civil society and transnational institutions. By civil society, we mean the various residential and interest communities as well as the individuals and nongovernmental institutions that constitute the social fabric. In the transnational institutions category, we include primary commodities corporations, multilateral international institutions, aid agencies and NGOs. Both civil society and transnational institutions take over the role of auspice from the state in order to protect their constituents, employees and the integrity of their operations. While each of these two auspices is far from being homogeneous, their constituents share a number of features that make their approaches to security very similar in both cases.

These three auspices activate providers that can be categorized as public, public under private arrangements, collective – or voluntary, private/national, private/international and criminal.

The state has traditionally been presented as the only institution willing and capable of providing security to its citizens. However, if we turn our gaze to the two other auspices outlined above, a legitimacy-resource test clearly demonstrates that they also possess some of the required features for the provision of security. Weak states are characterized by the disintegration of their governmental institutions and the inability – or lack of interest – of the latter to deliver basic services to the citizenry. This incapacitation of the state can be attributed to a number of factors, such as the colonial legacy of artificial state structures and boundaries that disregard ethnic, religious and tribal divisions, the economic pressures of international commodities markets, the monopolization of power by a corrupt and incompetent kleptocracy, or all of the above.

As a result, governmental institutions find themselves with very limited supplies of resources and legitimacy to authorize the provision of security. In countries such as Burma, North Korea, Albania and Russia, where the state has co-opted or has been co-opted by criminal organizations, this problem is exacerbated and legitimacy is eclipsed by blatant illegality, while resources are channeled toward
activities fostering insecurity (Dupont 2001: 174). Governments conducting systematic human rights abuses against minority groups face the same legitimacy and resource deficits.

Civil society as an auspice of security provision faces a different challenge. While it is often very rich in legitimacy, it is generally poor in resources, which limit its options for the authorization and funding of effective security arrangements. Transnational institutions, on the contrary, tend to be legitimacy-poor and resources-rich. Thus, the logic would suggest that the establishment of close partnerships between civil society and transnational institutions is likely to facilitate the birth of hybrid auspices, better adapted to the constraints of weak states than the current ones.

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These hybrid auspices would generate a cluster of linkages between civil society, the state and transnational institutions that would compensate the lack of strength by an increased adaptability, based on the power of networks-- what one of us describes as nodal governance (Shearing and Wood 2000). Furthermore, traditional culture-social groups that constitute civil society in failing states are characterized by a narrow radius of trust, which is the circle within which cooperative norms are operative (Fukuyama 1999). The hybridization of civil society and transnational institutions as security auspices has the potential to widen this radius of trust, and to increase the stock of social capital, strengthening governance structures of security.

The international community and aid agencies should recognize the benefits of this hybridization process and facilitate it, instead of focusing too narrowly on state institutions as recipients of their capacity-building programs. Too often, state-centered strategies sponsored by developed countries have exacerbated problems instead of resolving them, particularly in the field of security.

Let us now turn our attention to security providers, who in the absence of strong auspices are left to themselves and can become central instruments in the perpetuation of cycles of violence. Public providers of security such as the police tend to lack the accountability mechanisms usually found in strong states. They often resort to corrupt practices in order to supplement their inadequate salaries. In this context, the coercive technologies bestowed on police officers by the state are
used as private revenue raising tools, contributing to the insecurity of those who experience the full impact these public providers’ illegitimate and illegal authority.

It should not come as a surprise then that the population’s confidence in public security providers is minimal in weak states: in Lagos for example, the biggest city in sub-Saharan Africa, less than one third of the population consider the police effective (Adyemi et al., cited in Pérouse de Montclos 1997). In Russia, the proportion of the population expecting fair treatment by the police is comparable (World Bank 1997). Clearly, nongovernmental auspices find in this lack of confidence a strong incentive to explore alternative options for security provision.

Problems of legitimacy may persist, or may even be aggravated, when public providers sell their services to civil society and transnational institutions. In Indonesia for example, the army (TNI or Tentara Nasional Indonesia) estimates that 70 per cent of its soldiers’ revenues emanate from “non-official sources” such as local communities and foreign mining corporations (Bertrand 2002). Entire battalions are “rented” to ensure the protection of extraction sites. Similarly, in Papua New Guinea, the government agreed to meet mining interests’ demands for more security on and around extraction sites and to create a Rapid Deployment Unit only after the industry lobby group accepted to finance most of the expenditures related to it (Dinnen 2001).

The absence or inefficiency of state providers can also lead to the institutionalization of self-help, under the guise of voluntary vigilante associations. Cattle rustling, for example, is unlikely to be considered a high priority problem for the police in a disintegrating society. However, for rural communities, the effects can be disastrous and compromise their future. In response to this threat, communities form vigilante arrangements such as Rondas in Peru or Sungusungu in Tanzania (Yrigoyen Fajardo 1993; Hemed Bukurura 1993). In this case, the auspice and the provider are identical, because of the lack of resources.

One of the consequences of this mode of security provision is its propensity to arbitrariness. Justice is meted out on the spot, after an informal contradictory discussion between suspect, victim and vigilantes, procedural fairness not being the main preoccupation. The punishment is usually savage and brutal, in order to make an example for others, and can include kneecapping (Northern Ireland) or the burning alive of suspected shoplifters (Nigeria). If a sense of security is restored among the communities that resort to self-help, human rights are often victim of these schemes, which tend to fuel rather than weaken the circle of violence experienced by these communities.

Private security providers are not a new phenomenon, even if their responsibilities have fluctuated through history (Shearing 1992). What is new is the development
of international private security providers, whose size and expertise are equivalent, if not superior, to those of state security providers (Johnston 2000). Securitas, a Swedish security company, employs for example 230,000 people around the world and claims a global security market share of ten per cent. MPRI, another major player in the private provision of services to law enforcement agencies, boasts among its associates a retired FBI assistant director, a former US Assistant Attorney General and many former police chiefs.

Estimates place the number of these companies at a hundred worldwide. These multifunctional organizations offer a full range of services to nongovernmental and governmental clients. They have found a booming market in weak and failing states, where economic actors are willing to purchase products and services that hold the promise of reducing those risks and uncertainties that hamper their economic activities. In certain states, such as Angola, the government makes it compulsory for foreign investors to provide their own security, mainly through private security companies (FCO 2002).

These private security providers do not restrict their services to extracting companies and wealthy clients. They are increasingly intervening to protect the activities of NGOs and relief agencies. In other cases, they have even offered to act in place of state providers, requiring in payment a portion of the mineral resources found in the pacified regions. If this option seems attractive and can provide some temporary relief to the rampant insecurity found in weak states, it also contains a few drawbacks.

First, most of these providers mobilize paramilitary modes of action and expertise, more suited to states of war and counterinsurgency than to conflict resolution and peacemaking. Of course, they are able to create “peace bubbles” where they operate, but they do not engage the community in the production of security and these bubbles usually burst when they withdraw. In Sierra Leone for example, the South African company Executive Outcomes was instrumental in stabilizing the country, allowing the signature of a peace agreement and elections to be held. However, its departure was followed by a coup and the exile of the elected government, nullifying much of what had been achieved.

The lack of accountability and the absence of regulatory arrangements create some moral dilemmas for those advocating a more widespread use of private security providers. However, from a weak states auspice perspective, they remain a comparatively cheap, quick and effective way of securing order.

Finally, the last and least desirable form of security provision lies with criminal organizations, which can be seen as institutions offering security and protection to their members. The Sicilian Mafia, Chinese Triads and the Japanese Yakuza all
originated from mutual protection schemes in places where the state failed to perform this function (Gambetta 1993, Dupont 2001). Today, in Brazil, drug gangs produce justice for communities, regulating order in exchange for the protection of their illegal activities (Botelho Junqueira and Augusto de Souza Rodriques 1993). In the eyes of the marginalized communities that benefit from the security provided, the illegality of criminal groups does not in any way diminish their legitimacy, in the absence of another alternative.

As we have shown in the previous paragraphs, the disintegration of governmental capacity in weak and failing states creates a security vacuum that can be filled by several configurations of auspices and providers. Some of them might be morally objectionable, but the reality of their existence should not be denied. We argue that the moral dilemmas that are intrinsic to some of these configurations should be considered in their local contexts, which are, in every way conceivable, unlike the ordered world of democratic societies.

Most of these configurations are unable to provide long-term solutions for the governance of security, and to a certain extent reinforce the processes that perpetuate the weakening of the state. As we have seen, they rely on auspices that lack either resources or legitimacy, and on providers that are fragmented, serve narrow interests and seem to concentrate their activities on coercive measures. However, there is no fatality in this state of affairs, and all the elements are present – albeit in a dispersed order – that would allow the design of a new assemblage for the governance of security.

This model should harness local knowledge and external resources in order to provide security without compromising justice. It would bring together governmental and nongovernmental (both local and international) auspices, with the capacity to mobilize a broad range of providers held accountable through a variety of legal and contractual mechanisms.

We turn in the last section of this paper to a model being developed in South Africa that seeks to realize these requirements.

V. The Zwelethemba Model for Governing Security

While South Africa is by no means a weak state there are many parts of the country (urban, peri-urban and rural) where the governmental situation mirrors many of the features of weak states that we have identified. Since 1998 an experiment -- based on a partnership between a local NGO, the Community Peace Programme (which has subsequently become part the School of Government at the University of the Western Cape), two international governments (first Sweden and then Finland) through their aid programs and various levels of government and
governmental agencies -- has been taking place in poor urban collectivities ("squatter camps") where state-based governmental service is weak to develop a model for the governance of security that realizes the objectives noted above.

The work began in a community called Zwelethemba that is part of a small country town, Worcester, a little over 100 kilometres north of Cape Town. The model has been named after the community both to recognize the crucial role it played in its development and because “zwelethemba” means “country or place of hope”).

The hope that motivated the development of the Zwelethemba model was the development of institutions of micro-governance (that would operate through the window of security but not be limited to security) that would deliver effective and legitimate governmental services. The program to realize this hope began with a two-year pilot project that produced a basic model which is now begin refined and rolled out to new communities. At present it is operating in some 20 communities across three South African provinces. The core of the model is a process that gathers local people together to strive for a future oriented solution to disputes as well as solutions to generic problems within communities.

The most recent iteration of the model is one that integrates the dispute-resolution and problem-solving micro-institutions with the emergency response capacity of the state police. This is done through the creation of Community Peace Centres in which the police emergency response capacity is integrated with the community dispute-resolution and problem-solving capacity in ways that enable the police to spread their very limited resources much more widely than would be the case without this integration.

While the details of the model as it is evolving in South Africa are likely to be culturally specific the principles are transferable. This has recently been demonstrated through an ongoing project in which the principles have been transferred to two communities in Rosario, Argentina. While the core of the model (dispute-resolution and problem-solving through gatherings) has remained intact, details differ. Similar explorations of the model and its principles are being planned for Sao Paulo, Brazil and Toronto, Canada.

The essential features of the dispute-resolution and problem-solving aspects of the model developed in South Africa are as follows.

1. Peacemaking

Peacemaking focuses on disputes. It is particularly concerned with smaller everyday disputes that if left unresolved might escalate into serious problems. To
facilitate peacemaking a group of 6-10 people within a local collectivity establish a Peace Committee. Disputants bring disputes to the Committee. The Committee follows a set of tested steps and a Code of Good Practice in responding to the dispute. The essential feature of this response is a gathering together of local people (including the disputants) thought to have the capacity and knowledge to envisage and then to implement an enduring resolution to the dispute. A forward-looking approach is encouraged throughout the Gathering. It is the people gathered together, not the Committee members, who resolve problems and see to it that solutions are acted upon. A central provision of the Code of Good Practice is that force cannot be threatened or used.

2. Peacebuilding

In addition to seeking to contribute towards the resolution of interpersonal disputes the Committee also seeks to contribute to the resolution of more generic problems that are often thought of as community development issues – for example, issues of public health, education, security and the environment. The facilitation process is similar to peacemaking – that is, gathering people together to provide forward-looking solutions to problems. Needs-gatherings are held to identify generic problems. Solutions-gatherings are held to explore how to respond to these problems through the mobilization of local capacity and knowledge. Plans of action are developed and implemented to create solutions – for example, building a children’s park, developing dramas on health issues, support for primary educations centres, support for the aged, soup kitchens for children, youth programs and so on.

3. Partnerships

The first level of partnership built is between the Committees and local entrepreneurs of various sorts who can provide the capacity required to implement peacebuilding plans. This has been the focus to date. The Community Peace Centres mentioned above are seeking to build on this level of partnership by including the Police as a partner within an institutional and regulatory framework that was developed independently of the police. A partnership has also been built with local governments (see below) and with the South African Law Commission that is developing regulatory guidelines that draw upon the guidelines developed with and for Peace Committees.

4. Sustainability

The work of Peace Committees is sustained both through the involvement of international agencies (consistent with the strategy outlined earlier in the paper) in the form of support through the Finnish Embassy and through local governments.
The Finns provide support for the administrative services provided by the Community Peace Programme as well as the research and reflection that has and continues to guide the model building while local governments along with the Embassy provide direct support for Peace Committees and the Organizers and Coordinators who facilitate their work. The support for Peace Committees is provided according to the following formula that directs a portion of tax resources available to local municipalities directly into poor communities in ways that both promotes self-direction and contributes to community development. Committees are paid Rand 400 (approximately US$40) for every gathering held in accordance with agreed upon principles. Half of this goes “into the pockets” of Committee members who organize the gathering in recognition of the value of their knowledge, capacity, energy and time. The other half goes into a community-building fund to support peacebuilding projects. If a Committee arranges 10 gatherings a month that is the floor aimed at this brings what is in local terms a significant amount into the community in which the Committee works. For Committees that exceed this norm, for example, by arranging 30-40 gatherings a month the money that “puts food on the table” of members’ households and that is available for peacebuilding is be quite sizable in local terms.

5. Management

The program is managed at the community level through people drawn from Peace Committees, who organize, review and gather data. This is essential to the regulatory process (see below) and provides data required for both the outcome based payment scheme and the research and reflection noted above. These local Organizers and Coordinators are supported by a small professional staff (one full-time and three part-time).

6. Regulation

Regulation is embedded in the model rather than added on. Reviews are an essential part of both the peacemaking and peacebuilding processes and are required as part of the remuneration formula. In addition persons attending gatherings are asked to participate in “exit interviews” and regular base-line surveys are conducted.

Principles of the Model

At the heart of the model is the premise that good governance requires the mobilization of local knowledge and capacity and its integration with professional knowledge and capacity. This mobilization is used both to establishes auspices that direct governance and establishes sources of provision. To use a nautical metaphor both steering and rowing take place at the micro-level. This serves to
deepen democracy by involving local people directly in their own governance. In
doing so it enhances self-direction as well as the quality of service provision.
Mobilizing local knowledge and capacity requires sustainable institutional
arrangements that bring people with local knowledge and capacity to respond to
issues. Integrating local knowledge and capacity with other knowledges and
capacities – particularly those mobilized by state agencies – in ways that will
retain self-direction and local capacity requires institutional structures that will
ensure that state agencies do not dominate. Sustaining micro-governance requires
new ways of channelling tax derived resources to local communities as well as
ensuring ongoing support from international bodies that will assist in weathering
local political ups and downs as well as provide ongoing research, reflection and
international legitimacy. Regulation that will ensure compliance with
internationally recognized standards of good governance must be built into the
governance processes and supported through the remuneration template (see
Roche 2002 for a recent assessment of the Zwelethemba model).

VI. Conclusion

Reconfiguring the governance of security in weak and failing states requires a
dose of institutional creativity and audacity. Traditional models of governance,
which are undergoing considerable transformations in strong states and whose
transplant has often been instrumental in the disintegration of fledgling states
should no longer remain the only available option for the provision of security.

In their place, models that rely on local knowledge and the mobilization of a broad
range of resources have the potential to facilitate a de-escalation of violence and
disorder, while at the same time allowing communities to stabilize and recover
some of their lost strengths. The state, which is very often as much part of the
problem as of the solution, cannot remain the sole conduit by which security is
authorized and provided to vulnerable communities.

Other actors can make a valuable contribution. International aid agencies and
multinational extracting companies bring to weak states the resources and the
organisational infrastructure of the global. Residential and interest communities,
through their adaptive capacities and their intimate knowledge of the local ensure
the relevance of the model and the equitable diffusion of its benefits to their
members. States, to the extent to which they are genuinely democratic, bring to
this mix of resources and know-how the possibility of democratic regulation and
access to state taxes.

The rethinking and reordering we have proposed here challenges mental schemata
with which we are familiar and comfortable. This, however, is precisely what is
required.
Appendix (A)
Adapted from Grabosky (1996)

1. CONSCRIPTION
Governments may simply command third parties to assist with one or more processes of law enforcement, as in cash transaction reporting requirements or mandatory reporting of suspected child abuse.

2. REQUIRED PRIVATE INTERFACE
In contrast to conscription, where commands are directed at third parties, this approach entails governments requiring that targets of crime control engage the machinery of private institutions. Financial auditing requirements represent one example.

3. REQUIRED RECORD KEEPING AND DISCLOSURE
In order to encourage introspection, or with a view to informing markets or other private institutions in a position to foster compliance, governments may require disclosure of certain aspects of a regulated entity’s activities.

4. CO-OPTATION OF PRIVATE INTERESTS
In some settings, public agencies may actively seek the cooperation of private interests in furtherance of surveillance and detection. Neighborhood watch programs are one example.

5. CONFERRING ENTITLEMENTS
There are two basic avenues by which governments can empower private interests to enforce the law. The first entails the creation of certain specified rights, conferring them upon private parties, and leaving it up to those private parties to enforce. Many systems of patent, trademark and copyright rely on such private enforcement.

A second avenue of private enforcement entails empowering third parties to undertake enforcement actions on behalf of the state. In many jurisdictions, cases of cruelty to animals are investigated and prosecuted by societies for the prevention of cruelty to animals.

6. INCENTIVES
Governments may offer incentives directly to targets of regulation to induce compliance, or to engage in a desired course of conduct. They may also offer rewards and bounties for assistance in criminal investigations.
7. CONTRACTING OUT
Governments might seek to engage private consultants rather than rely upon in-house resources.

8. DELEGATION OR DEFERENCE TO PRIVATE PARTIES.
In some instances, governments may become aware that certain functions relating to compliance are already being performed or could be performed by private parties. Representatives of the relevant firm or industry association investigate many cases of insurance fraud and of copyright infringement.

9. ABDICATION
The state may simply abdicate some regulatory functions, and leave allocative and ordering decisions to the market. The growth of the private security sector is one example.

References


